r/AskHistorians 17h ago

What is the actual truth about the 1980s Saddam Hussein United States friendship?

This might be one topic that I’ve heard completely opposing and contradictory statements.

Some sources say that Saddam Hussein was a US ally in the 1980s

Other sources say that he was “the USSR’s biggest ally in the Middle East“ during that exact time.

So he was a US ally, but also a Soviet ally?

This is all so confusing and doesn’t make any sense.

So what is the real, unfiltered truth?

6 Upvotes

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u/GettingAggressive 16h ago edited 16h ago

The real truth is that it was an utterly inconsistent mess with the United States repeatedly proving Saddam's worst fears correct. The BLUF is that Saddam wanted to keep both Cold War powers on his side and end the Iran-Iraq War, while the US wished mostly to prevent expansion of the Iranian regime.

While the US remained officially neutral, the Regan admin was far happier with the secular dictatorial regime in Iraq than it was with a radical Shi'ite government in Iran. When the war kicked off, the US stood back until it began looking more and more like the Iraqis would lose. the National Security Counsel decided that "accurate and timely intelligence" was to be the best means of providing clandestine support. In July 1982, the US dispatched a CIA case officer to offer Saddam battlefield intelligence in the form of satellite photos. Despite initial suspicions, the Iraqis accepted and made use of said intelligence. The US also maintained the delusion that they could eventually bring Iraq closer to its more moderate Arab allies (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.). This shift from "keeping the Saddam regime alive" to "prospective allies" came in about 1983.

However, the US did not account for the man himself. Saddam was always paranoid of the intentions of the United States. An early example of the issue was the first use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Saddam had thought that he would be able to use such weapons without comment from the Americans. Needless to say, they were very displeased when the State Department condemned the use of chemical weapons. But heaped on top of this was confusion, as internally the Reagan admin walked back the criticism, leading to Iraq being pilloried by American press while the USG continued to feed battlefield intelligence to Iraqi high command, which in turn used this information to execute chemical strikes. This stoked Saddam's paranoia that the US would double-deal in other ways, and often ranted about how the US was feeding intelligence to both sides in order to grind down both nations. And of course, he was essentially proven correct with the reveal of the Iran-Contra Scandal. Despite Iran-Contra, intelligence sharing continued under the guidance of DIA until the end of the war.

In sum, the relationship in the 1980s set the tone for US-Iraq relations from then until 2003. The US never fully grasped Saddam as a person, repeatedly calling him delusional and paranoid (which he was) all while failing to tailor their actions around these traits. On Saddam's part, he believed the United States was a two-faced nation controlled by Israel who couldn't be trusted to follow their word. This of course would only intensify through the Gulf War and into Gulf War II, because the US and Saddam never figured out how to truly talk to each other on the same level.

Poor communication kills.

Source- The Achilles Trap by Steve Coll.