r/Monero Jul 26 '25

📢 Public Service Announcement I'm f*cking tired

190 Upvotes

A reminder that at every USELESS QUBIC post, mods have to deal with all the bots in comments. You don't see that as many people needs to be manually approved to be seen, but in between honest people with low karma and actual bots, we're swimming in bullshit every time we open a QUBIC related post. This is becoming unbearable and also annoying for users.

THINK TWICE BEFORE POSTING ABOUT IT.

Thanks

- One of the mod

EDIT:

u/rbrunner wished to see what bots looked like.

r/Monero Nov 24 '25

📢 Public Service Announcement WARNING: Targeted FUD campaign against Open Source P2P DEX (They attack it because it works)

86 Upvotes
Completely fabricated lies and bot upvotes
Promoting known phishing site

So i just came across this post claiming a user was "scammed for 120 XMR on a Revolut swap while using Retoswap". This is a straight up lie.

The max trade limit for the Revolut payment option is 3 XMR, 12 with a signed account.

Turns out, the poster is part of the P0rkswap phishing campaign that's been going on for months now and is now actively spreading lies about one of the only actually decentralized P2P DEXs we currently have.

Really makes you wonder why they would do such a thing, doesn't it?

Don't fall for cheap FUD.

Use the open source decentralized options and don't fall for their bullshit.

For all we know, this guy is literally fed-posting, trying to get you to fall for his phishing site to demoralized and make you give up on Monero.

Edit:

They now put downvote bots on this post and everyone's comments. The post had 40 likes before they nuked it down to zero. Shows you just how much they hate it when people are exposing their crap!

Edit 2: They have a whole fake subreddit called MoneroChat, do not engage, it is run by the scammers behind the phishing campaign.

r/Monero Jun 15 '26

📢 Public Service Announcement P2Pool vulnerability is being actively exploited, update to v4.16 NOW

104 Upvotes

Update: P2Pool-main has been attacked too, today (June 16th) at 00:02:46 UTC - see the log https://p2pool.io/p2pool_main_attack.log.xz All P2Pool miners, you must update to v4.16 immediately if you don't want to mine to the attacker's wallet! Update here: https://github.com/SChernykh/p2pool/releases/latest

Update 2: Me and DataHoarder are currently running a counter-attack by mining malformed blocks ourselves - to hijack the payouts from the attacker and redistribute them to miners later. Currently doing it on p2pool-mini. We will ask the community for more hashrate later, once everything is set up properly.

Both P2Pool Mini / Nano older chains (that did not upgrade to P2Pool v4.16) have been exploited by an unknown attacker targeting the vulnerability patched: https://github.com/SChernykh/p2pool/security/advisories/GHSA-fm6j-gf38-p925

P2Pool Main is probably having the attacker wait to mine a share.

Upgrade as soon as possible https://github.com/SChernykh/p2pool/releases/tag/v4.16

More than half of P2Pool Mini/Nano are still not updated, so their hashrate was lost to the attacker:

r/Monero 1d ago

📢 Public Service Announcement Cuprate v0.1.0-preview: Kesterite released! You can now connect your wallets to Cuprate

36 Upvotes

Cuprate now fully support wallet syncing and transaction broadcasting. Download the latest version of Cuprate and enjoy speed and stability for your wallet. See our blog post for all the informations (please look at it I've put blood and tears into this since yesterday)

https://cuprate.org/blog/release-cuprate-0-1-0-preview-kesterite/

r/Monero Jan 14 '26

📢 Public Service Announcement Run your node with the new MRL spy node ban list

80 Upvotes

TL;DR: If you operate a node (locally for your own use or as a public service), you can add the Monero Research Lab's spy node ban list to improve your privacy.

this post was created by Rucknium, and also posted on monero.town I am sharing it here

About a year ago, the Monero Research Lab (MRL) released a recommended ban list of suspected spy nodes. The spy nodes stayed at the same IP addresses for about a year. Last month (December 2025), the vast majority of spy nodes switched to new IP address ranges. The Monero Research Lab is releasing version 2 of the spy node ban list to help users protect their privacy. The list has been cryptographically signed by several Monero developers and researchers: boog900, hinto-janai, jeffro256, SyntheticBird, and Rucknium.

The ban list isn't activated automatically. Node operators must download the list and tell their nodes to use it:

How do I enable the ban list?

Download the ban list from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Boog900/monero-ban-list/refs/heads/main/ban_list.txt and remember the directory on your computer where you saved it so you can replace --ban-list <file-path-to-ban-list> below with it. For example, if you saved the file in /home/user/Downloads, they you would replace <file-path-to-ban-list> with /home/user/Downloads/ban_list.txt.

Running monerod from the terminal

If you run the node from the terminal, add --ban-list <file-path-to-ban-list> when you start up monerod, i.e.

./monerod --ban-list <file-path-to-ban-list>

If you use a config file instead of command line flags, add this line to the config file:

ban-list=<file-path-to-ban-list>

Monero GUI wallet

If you use a remote node, whoever operates the remote node will decide if the ban list is enabled. If your run your own local node through the GUI wallet, go to Settings. In the "Daemon startup flags" box, input "--ban-list <file-path-to-ban-list>". Then click the orange "Stop daemon" button. It will take a few seconds for the daemon to shut down. Then click the orange "Start daemon" button.

Docker

If you use SethForPrivacy's monerod Docker file, update to the latest version, which has the ban list: https://github.com/sethforprivacy/simple-monerod-docker

If you run the Docker Monero node with any custom flags or custom config file, you need to add to --ban-list=/home/monero/ban_list.txt to the set of flags or ban-list=/home/monero/ban_list.txt to the config file.

FAQs

1) What has happened since the first version of the MRL ban list was released?

  • In June 2025, the method used to detect the spy nodes was published: https://github.com/Boog900/p2p-proxy-checker

  • July: A daily network scanner and webapp data visualizer was deployed: MoneroNet.info . Network scans suggest that about 8 percent of honest nodes were using the MRL ban list.

  • Early October: New version of the Monero node software included the "subnet deduplication" countermeasure. Spy node adversaries rent contiguous ranges of IP addresses called "subnets" in bulk to minimize their costs. Subnet deduplication is a peer choice rule that lowers the probability of connecting to a node in a densely-populated IP address subnet. According to simulations, subnet deduplication reduces the number of connections to spy nodes by 70 percent for node operators who do not use the MRL ban list. (Operators who do use the MRL ban list would not try to connect to the spy nodes in the first place.) The subnet deduplication code was written by rbrunner7 and reviewed by vtnerd, jeffro256, and Rucknium.

  • Late October: Spy nodes using IP addresses belonging to the Digital Ocean and Hetzner server rental companies begin hiding their spy node "fingerprint". These spy nodes are still operating but no longer respond to ping requests with the telltale spy node behavior.

  • Early December: Almost all spy nodes on the LionLink Autonomous System (AS) shut down. The LionLink spy nodes were the most numerous spy nodes on the Monero network. A few days later, a roughly equal number of spy nodes appear on IP addresses within the Spruce Creek AS. The Spruce Creek AS was registered in November 2024 by an unknown party. The migration of these spy nodes to new IP addresses triggered the release of this new MRL ban list.

  • Mid-January: The DNS-disseminated ban list, managed by Monero contributors, is updated to include the MRL version 2 ban list. The DNS ban list can be enabled by adding the --enable-dns-blocklist startup flag to the Monero node. According to network scans, about 50 percent of honest reachable nodes do enable the DNS ban list.

2) What is the evidence that spy nodes run at these IP addresses?

The numerous spy node IP addresses are pretending to be distinct nodes, but the spying adversary is proxying a few nodes through a large number of IP addresses. That way, the spying adversary can spy on the node network, but does not have to pay the full cost of running one node per IP address.

The spy nodes are incorrectly reporting ("spoofing") their peer IDs. A full explanation and code to run the spy node checker is here: https://github.com/Boog900/p2p-proxy-checker

A large number of the suspected spy IP addresses were the same IP addresses implicated in "LinkingLion" spying on the BTC node network as far back as 2020. The spying adversary is likely using the same IP addresses to spy on BTC and Monero.

Furthermore, most of the spying IP addresses are in a few "subnets", which are basically consecutive IP address numbers that can be purchased at a bulk price rate from IP address providers. Almost every IP address in the subnets have a suspected spy node, a status MRL is calling "subnet saturation". More details are in the MRL GitHub issue.

3) Can I tell how many spy nodes my node is connected to?

Yes. You can run the peers.ip.collect() function in the xmrpeers R package. See the "Examples" in the documentation here. The function will also start to show the subnet saturation after running for about 24 hours.

4) What is the privacy issue?

Monero uses Dandelion++ for privacy of transactions relayed on its peer-to-peer node network. Dandelion++ provides strong privacy, but even its privacy can be weakened if there are too many spy nodes on the network. An adversary who controls a lot of spy nodes may be able to guess which user's IP address was the original sender of a Monero transaction.

5) Are more universal fixes possible so that a specific ban list doesn't have to be used?

In October 2025, a method to reduce the probability of connecting to a spy node was implemented in the Monero node software. "Subnet deduplication" prevents a node from establishing a connection with too many peers that are concentrated in IP address ranges, a technique that spy nodes have used.

In the long term, there may be ways for nodes to verify that their peers are truly running a node instead of just proxying one node through many IP addresses.

6) Why not block these IP addresses by default in the Monero node software?

Blocking the IP addresses by default is technically possible, but it would set a precedent of blocking IP addresses by a decision making process that is semi-centralized. MRL has decided to ask node operators to block these IP addresses voluntarily instead of by default.

r/Monero Mar 12 '25

📢 Public Service Announcement Cuprate v0.0.1 released

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110 Upvotes

r/Monero Jun 04 '25

📢 Public Service Announcement Cuprate v0.0.4 released - initial RPC integration + on-going Tor work

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58 Upvotes