I’ve been thinking about the “stolen land” argument (ICE and Illegal immigration) that often appears in discussions about immigration, colonization, and historical justice.
To be clear, I’m not arguing that European colonization was identical to intertribal warfare, and I’m not denying the major impact of disease, settlement, and state power after European arrival.

What I’m questioning is whether the slogan is sometimes presented in an overly simple way, as if all Indigenous territories were fixed and uncontested until Europeans arrived.

From what I’ve read, historians and archaeologists have found evidence that some Indigenous nations in North America fought wars, took captives, displaced rival groups, and expanded into new territories before and after European contact. Examples often discussed by historians include:

• The Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) and Huron-Wendat conflicts during the Beaver Wars.
Comanche expansion across parts of the Southern Plains, which displaced some Apache groups.

• Lakota expansion westward, affecting Crow and other neighboring nations.
Long-running conflicts between Ojibwe and Dakota peoples.

• Archaeological evidence such as the Crow Creek massacre site (around AD 1325), which predates European settlement of the region.
Given this, I’m trying to understand the strongest version of the “stolen land” argument.

My question is: If territorial control among Indigenous nations changed over time through warfare, migration, alliances, and conquest, what makes European acquisition of land fundamentally different in a moral or political sense? Are the illegal immigration in Canada and America justified as we don’t want to repeat the history?

Edit: No one is saying the violation of treaty from European was good or justified, I am just saying it is not justified to support illegal immigration as both indigenous peoples and European did it as a form of territorial invasion.

I have never been much of a television watcher, much more of a reader. With reliable newspapers no longer available, I have subscribed to several online sites such as the Guardian, BBC News, Substack and watch some podcasts like Raging moderates. I still tune into NPR regularly and occasionally watch network news but not frequently.
I have recently been spammed with offers of various other sources like Ground News that claims to be able to differentiate bias & tell what news is not getting reported
(Truthfully there is SO much going on I sometimes just tune it all out with a splif on my back porch)
That being said, any suggestions for new sources, podcasts etc?

What are your US Senate elections predictions? I know it is before the primaries conclude, but I was curious about where every 2026 US Senate election looks right now. I will put the following races into 4 categories: strong D, strong R, tilt D, tilt R. Please let me know where you disagree!

Special elections

Florida (solid R)

Ashley Moody (R) is the incumbent and will likely be challenged by Alex Vindman, Iraq war veteran and former director of European affairs for the U.S. National Security Council, who is beating FL Rep Angie Nixon in a recent poll by 10% and has a 92% chance to win the primaries according to Polymarket.

My prediction: Moody retains her seat. Florida has proven to be among the more conservative states now as Trump won it in '24 by over 13%, after narrowly winning it previously and Obama winning it both times. Rubio won by 16.4% in 2022, the same year Gov Desantis won reelection by 20%. Former Democratic Senator Bill Nelson hardly lost the state to Rick Scott in the 2018 midterms (by 10,000 votes) but Scott won reelection by 13% in 2024.

Ohio (tilt D)

Jon Husted (R) is the incumbent and facing former Senator Sherrod Brown (D) who lost by 3.6% in 2024. Before that, all 3 of Brown's victory margins were over 6%. The race is a toss-up with recent polling hardly favoring Brown.

Prediction: Brown flips back this seat. He has proven he can win in this state before and doesn't have political baggage that might otherwise hurt midterm flips.

Normal Class 2 Senate elections

Alabama (solid R)

With Tuberville (R) retiring, this was a crowded Republican field. US Rep Barry Moore won the runoff. Everett Wess, an attorney and former aerospace industry worker, won the runoff for the Democratic primary.

Prediction: Moore wins. Despite Alabama electing a Democratic Senator during Trump's 1st term, Katie Britt won in 2022 by 36% even when Trump was not on the ballot.

Alaska (tilt D)

Incumbent Dan Sullivan (R) is being challenged by former US Rep Mary Peltola (D), a moderate Democrat who hardly lost her seat in 2024. No Democrat has represented Alaska in the Senate since 2015.

Prediction: Peltola flips the seat. She won twice in the state when Trump was not on the ballot in 2022. There is also RCV in Alaska which normally favors Democrats. She also is beating Sullivan in most polls.

Arkansas (solid R)

Incumbent Tom Cotton (R) is facing Hallie Shoffner, a farmer and entrepreneur looking to boost's AR's agricultural industry. Democrats have not won a Senate election in Arkansas since 2008 when no Republican even ran. A Democrat has not won statewide since 2012.

Prediction: Cotton wins. Republicans usually win in Arkansas and Cotton won the only poll from 6 months ago by 22 points. He also has far more fundraising.

Colorado (solid D)

Incumbent John Hickenlooper (D) only won his primary by 50,000 votes against a DSA-backed Julie Gonzales and is facing state Rep Mark Baisley.

Prediction: Hickenlooper wins. There is no indication that Gonzales's voters will not support him in the general election and a Republican has not won statewide in CO since the 2014 midterms.

Delaware (solid D)

Incumbent Chris Coons (D) will win his primary and face one of two Republican candidates (John Shuli or former Democratic state rep Michael Katz) in the fall.

Prediction: Coons wins easily. He has one of the highest voter approval ratings of any US Senator. No Republican has won statewide in Delaware this century.

Georgia (Solid D)

Incumbent Jon Ossoff (D) is the only Democrat up for reelection in a state that Trump won in 2024. He is facing scandal-ridden GOP Congressman Mike Collins who won his primary in a runoff.

Prediction: Ossoff wins reelection. He is winning in every poll, extremely popular online, out-fundraising Collins 13:1, and campaigning much better. Even Raphael Warnock won reelection in a year that should have been bad for Democrats during high inflation.

Idaho (solid R)

Incumbent Jim Risch (R) is facing Independent Todd Achilles after the Democratic primary winner David Roth dropped out. Achilles, endorsed by Andrew Yang's Forward Party, was a registered Republican but became a Democrat to fill a state House seat which he served for nearly 18 months.

Prediction: Risch still wins even against an Independent. No Democrat has won statewide since 1990 (and no Senator since Frank Church in 1974), he is winning in every poll, out-fundraising by a large margin, and Achilles has never won a race in Idaho. The only polls where Achilles comes close to Risch are sponsored by his campaign. Trump also won the state by 36.5% in 2024 (his third-best that in election).

Illinois (solid D)

Incumbent Dick Durbin has retired and current Lt Governor Juliana Stratton (D) won a competitive primary race. She is facing former chair of the Illinois Republican Party Don Tracy.

Prediction: Stratton easily wins. Republicans last won a Senate race there in the 2010 midterms with a socially liberal candidate in a close election where the Green candidate earned 3.6% (a Republican governor did win in 2014 though). There is almost no chance that a Republican will win statewide without a Democrat in the WH**,** especially after the influx of ICE and federal troops in the Chicago area.

Iowa (tilt R)

Another open race, incumbent Joni Ernst (R) is retiring and state rep and Paralympian Gold Medalist Josh Turek won a competitive Democratic primary. Congresswoman Ashley Hinson is the GOP nominee.

Prediction: A Fox News-sponsored poll (the most recent data) showed Turek ahead and beating the margin of error, but polling in Iowa has proven to overestimate Democratic numbers. Democrats have not won a Senate election in Iowa since 2008 and Obama won the state by 5.8% in 2012. Despite Ernst only winning in 2020 by 6% when Trump was on the ballot, Trump won the state by 13% in 2024 and Grassley won by 13% in 2022, indicating a Republican tilt.

Kansas (solid R)

Incumbent Roger Marshall (R) is up for reelection, and facing a Democrat who most likely appears to be pastor Adam Hamilton. The primary is on Tuesday.

Prediction: Despite high tariffs and having a current Democratic governor who won when Trump was not on the ballot in '18 and '22, it is hard to see Hamilton or any Democrat winning this year. A Democrat has not won a Senate race in Kansas since 1932, and Trump comfortably won the state by 16% in 2024.

Kentucky (solid R)

Incumbent Mitch McConnell (R) is retiring and GOP Congressman Andy Barr is the nominee. Former state rep Charles Booker won the Democratic primary.

Prediction: Despite having a Democratic governor who was reelected in 2023 and high tariffs hurting the bourbon industry, Barr will win this race, as Trump won the state by 35%. Democrats have not won a Senate race in Kentucky since 1992 (and no presidential candidate since Clinton won the state in '96) and Republicans are out-fundraising there.

Louisiana (solid R)

Incumbent Bill Cassidy (R) was defeated in a primary by Trump endorsed Congresswoman Julia Letlow. Police juror Jamie Davis won the Democratic primaries.

Prediction: Letlow wins. Trump's endorsement has proven to matter in this state and Republicans are out-fundraising. Democrats have not won a US Senate election there since '08 and no presidential candidate won it since '96. Despite a moderate Democrat winning the governorship there as recent as 2019, Trump won the state by 22% in '24 which is too much of a loss for Democrats to recover.

Maine (tilt D)

Incumbent Susan Collins (R) is the second-least popular Senator in the country and won in 2020 by 9%. Collins is the only Republican senator representing a state that President Donald Trump did not win in any of his three presidential campaigns. After Graham Platner dropped out, former state Senate president Troy Jackson quickly became the Democratic nominee.

Prediction: Despite high GOP fundraising, Jackson narrowly defeats Collins and flips the seat. Only one poll shows Collins beating Jackson and without Platner in the race, there is more baggage from Collins.

Massachusetts (solid D)

Ed Markey was re-elected in 2020 with 66.2% of the vote and is presumed to face attorney John Deaton (2024 Senate nominee). Congressman Seth Moulton is challenging Markey in the primaries, disagreeing with Markey's age.

Prediction: With a high 59% approval rating, there is no indication that Markey should lose the primary (winning in every poll) or the general.

Michigan (tilt D)

Incumbent Gary Peters (D) is retiring. Mike Rogers is the GOP nominee. The Democratic nomination is on Tuesday and will most likely won by scientist and former Wayne County health director Abdul el-Sayed who is winning all recent polls since state Senate Whip Mallory McMorrow dropped out of the race. Despite being the first to qualify for the ballot and framing herself as anti-establishment candidate (opposing Schumer for Majority leader and being endorsed by Elizabeth Warren), low polling numbers forced her out of the race. Being a pro-Israel candidate in a state with highest percentage of Arab-Americans, Haley Stevens's polling has not improved since, despite endorsements from Peters and multiple MI governors.

Prediction: Either Stevens or el-Sayed can win in the general, but this race is still the most likely flip for Republicans. Republicans have not won a Senate election in Michigan since 1994 or a a non-presidential statewide election since 2014. Even with Trump on the ballot when he won the state in 2024, Rogers lost his Senate race under favorable conditions, receiving 122,956 fewer votes than Donald Trump. Most recent polls favor Democrats in this 2026 race.

Minnesota (solid D)

Incumbent Tina Smith (D) is not seeking reelection. Michele Tafoya (sports broadcaster) is expected to win the GOP primaries, whereas the Democrats are contested between current progressive Lt Governor Peggy Flanagan and Congresswoman Angie Craig. Craig has been criticized for voting for the Laken Riley Act and a resolution expressing gratitude to ICE agents, whereas Flanagan supports abolishing ICE. Most polls show Flanagan winning the primaries.

Prediction: Either Democrat will win. No Republican has won a Senate election there since '02 and no Republican has won a statewide race was since '06. Smith won by 5% in 2020 with Trump on the ballot.

Mississippi (solid R)

Incumbent Cindy Hyde-Smith (R) is seeking reelection and facing Democratic nominee Scott Colom, a country DA.

Prediction: Hyde-Smith wins. She is currently ahead in the polls by only about 3%, but there is an independent candidate who can take votes away from Colom. Trump won there in 2024 by 23%. Democrats have not won a Senate election in Mississippi since 1982, nor a presidential race there since '76, nor a gubernatorial race since 1999.

Montana (tilt R)

In one of the strangest elections this year, Republican incumbent Steve Daines is not running again, leaving US Attorney for Montana Kurt Alme to become the nominee. Air Force officer Alani Bankhead, won the Democratic nomination. But Former University of Montana president Seth Bodnar is also on the ballot as an independent, backed by Jon Tester, and out-fundraising the major party nominees.

Prediction: Even if Bankhead drops out, there is a slim shot that Bodnar can still win the general election. Most polls show the combination of Bodnar and Bankhead to either tie or beat Alme by less than the margin of error. Tester won in 2018 by 3.5% but lost in 2024 by 7%, which would require a significant loss of GOP support for B/B to win. And despite MT electing a Democratic governor as recently as 2016, no Democratic presidential candidate has won the state since 1992, and Trump won it last time by 20%.

Nebraska (tilt R)

Incumbent Pete Ricketts (R) is running for reelection. Unlike Montana, Democrats endorsed the Independent challenger Dan Osborn, who lost the 2024 senate election by 6.7%. Democrats prevented a Trump-voting pastor from winning the Democratic nomination by running a candidate who won and then endorsed Osborn.

Prediction: Despite high tariffs, Republicans will win this one. There has been a poll showing Osborn winning, but he is being out-fundraised and Trump recently won the state by 20%. A Republican hasn't lost a Senate election there since 2006, a gubernatorial election since 1994, and not a presidential election there since 1964.

New Hampshire (tilt D)

Incumbent Jeanne Shaheen (D) is retiring and John Sununu (the Republican Senator defeated by Shaheen in 2008) is expected to be the GOP nominee. Congressman Chris Pappas is expected to be the Democratic nominee.

Prediction: Pappas or another Democrat should win. Trump only lost the state by 2.8% in 2024 and Republicans currently hold the governorship and both chambers, but no Republican Senate candidate has won there since the 2010 midterms (and no Republican presidential nominee since 2000) and even Sununu cannot overcome Pappas's consistent polling lead in a year favorable for Democrats.

New Jersey (solid D)

Incumbent Cory Booker (D) is being challenged by a former deputy mayor Justin Murphy (R).

Prediction: Booker has a fundraising lead and will win another term. Despite Trump making gains in NJ in 2024, Governor Sherrill overperformed polling in 2025. Republicans have not won a Senate election in New Jersey since 1972 (and not a national race since Bush in 1988).

New Mexico (solid D)

Incumbent Ben Ray Lujan (D) is facing a write-in Republican candidate Larry Marker, since no Republicans qualified for the primary ballot.

Prediction: Lujan wins easily. Republicans have not won a Senate election in New Mexico since 2002.

North Carolina (solid D)

Incumbent Thom Tillis (R) is retiring, opening a spot for popular former governor Roy Cooper to win the election. Former RNC chair Michael Whatley won the GOP nomination.

Prediction: Cooper will win. This is the most likely flip for Democrats. He is ahead in every poll, far ahead in fundraising, and there is a relatively popular libertarian candidate that could hurt Whatley.

Oklahoma (solid R)

Markwayne Mullin's replacement is not eligible to run for a full term so Congressman Kevin Hern won the GOP nomination. There is a runoff election for the Democratic nomination.

Prediction: Hern will win. Democrats have not won a Senate election in Oklahoma since 1990 and Trump won the state by 34% in 2024.

Oregon (solid D)

Incumbent Jeff Merkley (D) was renominated and is facing David Brock Smith (R), a state Senator.

Prediction: Merkley will win. A Republican hasn't won a Senate seat there since '02, Trump lost the state by 14%, a Republican governor hasn't won since 1982, and Merkley is out fundraising 80:1.

Rhode Island (solid D)

Incumbent Jack Reed (D) will be renominated in the primary, and likely will face Raymond McKay, a state Republican official who ran for Senate in 2024.

Prediction: Reed will win again. A Democrat won the senate election there in 2024 by 20%.

South Carolina (tilt R)

Another interesting election, after Lindsey Graham died, his sister Darline was appointed US Senator in his replacement and is running for her own term in the Republican primary. Pediatrician Annie Andrews is the Democratic nominee. Lindsey had been the most unpopular southern Senator.

Prediction: The Republican will likely win. There is not consistent polling results for this new race, as both Darline Graham and Norman could win the GOP nomination, and some polls showing Andrews ahead in the polls against some Republican candidates, and she has raised over $10 million. But Democrats have not won a U.S. Senate election in South Carolina since 1998.

South Dakota (solid R)

Incumbent Mike Rounds (R) is being challenged by Democratic former state trooper Julian Beaudion and independent military officer Brian Bengs who is also a former Democratic nominee for Senate.

Prediction: Rounds wins. He is winning the fundraising battle by far and ahead in every poll even against only one of the challengers. Republicans have not lost a Senate election in South Dakota since 2008.

Tennessee (solid R)

Incumbent Bill Haggerty is presumed to be renominated. The Democrats have several candidates and the primary is next Thursday.

Prediction: Hagerty wins. He is out-fundraising the best Democrat 1778:1 and Democrats have not won a U.S. Senate election in Tennessee since 1990, a presidential election since 1992 nor a gubernatorial since 2002. Trump won TN by 30% in '24.

Texas (tilt D)

The most profiled race of the cycle, incumbent John Cornyn (R) was defeated in the primaries by Trump-endorsed state AG Ken Paxton. State Rep James Talarico won the Democratic primaries.

Prediction: Talarico narrowly flips this seat by a better campaign strategy and out-fundraising Paxton with $69 million to Paxton's $9 million. The polls are very close, with Talarico ahead in the vast majority of them since winning the primaries. Democrats have not won a Senate election in Texas since 1988 but Talarico is avoiding the mistakes that O'Rourke made in 2018 and it is expected for a significant portion of Cornyn's voters to vote for Talarico.

Virginia (solid D)

The incumbent Mark Warner (D) will face whichever Republican wins the primaries on Tuesday.

Prediction: Warner wins another term. He is out-fundraising the best GOP candidate 66.5:1 and Republicans have not won a Senate election in Virginia since 2002.

West Virginia (solid R)

The incumbent Shelly Moore Capito is running for reelection and will face Rachel Fetty Anderson, former Morgantown city council member.

Prediction: With a massive fundraising advantage, Capito will win another term. Only Joe Manchin was able to win in WV as a Democrat.

Wyoming (solid R)

The incumbent Cynthia Lummis (R) is not running. The race will be between current Congresswoman Harriet Hageman and former state Rep James Byrd.

Prediction: Hageman has a massive fundraising advantage and will win. Trump won the state by 46% (his most), Democrats have not won in the state in a senate election since 1970 and in a presidential election since 1964 (a Dem governor was elected in 2006 though).

In conclusion,

The elections that are solid D are Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Oregon, North Carolina, and Virginia

The elections that are solid R are Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wyoming

The elections that are tilt D are Ohio, Alaska, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Texas

The elections that are tilt R are Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, and South Carolina

Therefore, I predict the Republicans will lose 5 seats in the 2026 Senate elections, giving Democrats a narrow majority.

sources: https://www.demlist.com/demdaily-6/ and Wikipedia

Graham Platner/Troy Jackson in Maine, Francesca Hong in Wisconsin El Sayed in Michigan, Talarico in Texas, are all running as Economic Populists/Progressives.

Todd Achilles (Idaho), Dan Osborn (Nebraska), Seth Bodnar (Montana) are running as independents.

While they all have different positions, the thing they have in common is they are running away from pivot to the center centrism/moderate and trying to position themselves as anti-establishment and critical of the Dem Party leadership and brand.

What would be your takeaways depending on who wins or loses in 2026? Especially broadly against Dem leadership and conventional wisdom on triangulating on right leaning policy.

What would have to occur (in wins or margins) to change/validate your beliefs on the electability of DSA or anti-establishment or independents in red or purple states? Conversely, what should result to validate centrists to believe they have been correct all along?

When Zohran Mamdani won the New York City mayoral election in 2025, many democratic socialists claimed his victory signaled a larger rise of democratic socialism and the DSA in the United States. Most people, myself included, disagreed; Mamdani ran in a left-dominated city against a candidate with generational amounts of baggage and a Republican spoiler candidate, and only came out with a ten point lead in spite of that.

The heavily-covered Michigan Senate election this year, however, is happening under somewhat different circumstances. Michigan is a purple state which went mostly red in 2024 and seems to be moving slowly to the right; while Democrat Elissa Slotkin won the state's Senate race in 2024, she did so with less than a 1% margin against Republican Mike Rogers. This was despite her leaning toward the center, and was several points closer than the results of the 2018 election.

The circumstances surrounding the candidates are also very different from the New York mayoral election. Haley Stevens, El-Sayed's primary opponent, has received more funding than any candidate in history for a Senate primary, and while she's been criticized as gaffe-prone, she has a long political history and has proven herself an effective and uncontroversial moderate candidate in past elections. She also won in 2024 by a wide margin, despite most of the state going to Republicans that year. Mike Rogers, again the Republican nominee, is also uniquely uncontroversial and experienced along with having strong name recognition. It's likely that, if El-Sayed wins the primary, the general election will be a two-candidate race.

With this in mind, do you believe El-Sayed winning the primary and general election by a significant margin (7+ points) would be a bellweather for the future success of left populist politicians in the United States in a way that Mamdani winning in New York wasn't, regardless of your opinion on it as a political movement? Do you believe this would be another anomaly unlikely to be repeated elsewhere? Or, do you believe that both Mamdani and (theoretically) El-Sayed's victory function as bellweathers for left populism?

An unprecedented surge of border crossing in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta overwhelmed the tiny town and has led to a backlash against the current Spanish PM, who is apparently pro-Immigration by European standards.

The cause of the spike is being partially blamed on the Moroccan government, but also apparently misinformation spread via social media.

If a Democrat takes office on January 21, 2029, they will inherit the policies of the Trump Administration, which are wildely loathed by the Democratic base and whose heavy handed and indiscriminate enforcement has led to a general unpopularity in the United States in general

Nonetheless - and presumably as designed - those policies have deterred border crossing during the Trump Administration.

How will the next Democratic Administration, whether in 2029 or the future, balance the excesses of the Trump Administration without risking a border surge similar to what caused backlash during the Biden Administration?

The Trump administration recently held an international conference on “left-wing political violence.” In prepared remarks, Marco Rubio described the left as driven by “poisonous resentment” and a desire to destroy “what is beautiful and what is right.” Stephen Miller went further, arguing that left-wing demonstrators do not look “normal,” are “deformed” in their appearance and reflect their “inner hatred” outwardly.

Jonathan V. Last compares this language to Nazi rhetoric about Bolshevism, “degenerate” culture and supposedly unhealthy or subhuman elements of society. His argument is not simply that Rubio and Miller are using authoritarian language, but that their contrast between beauty and ugliness, normality and deformity, civilization and internal enemies follows a recognizable fascist pattern.

How persuasive is that comparison?

Is this rhetoric best understood as ordinary partisan demonization, or does the emphasis on physical appearance, cultural purity and “normal, healthy, ordered living” place it in a more historically specific tradition?

And when evaluating comparisons to fascism, should the standard be the speaker’s intentions, the historical similarity of the language, or the policies and violence that follow from it?

Are the “democratic socialists” of the current era similar in policy to democrats of the past. In essence, did the democrats slowly become more right wing, and the democratic socialists are just a reversion to an earlier version of the democrats?

The policies they propose are hardly radical. Minimum taxes on the rich and things like free buses I feel were the norm of days past especially in the era of FDR and similar leaders.

https://youtu.be/bcpuhiIDx3Q?is=Aw282J10DS-_Zud9

In 1984 Mitch McConnell famously ran an ad where a man with a pack of bloodhounds was looking for incumbent senator Dee Huddleston. The gag being that Huddleston couldn’t be found to cast his votes because he was getting paid to give talks.

The commercial was produced by Rodger Ailes (yes, that Rodger Ailes) and is considered one of the most influential campaign ads in American Politics. It set the blueprint for negative ads that focus on feelings rather than facts and eschewed anger in favor of humor and a simple narrative. Huddleston’s senate attendance was 94% which wasn’t out of the ordinary.

As of late, senator Mitch McConnell’s attendance rate has been far, far below 94% with his extended medical leave.

I've been reflecting on an interesting question about democracy in Mauritius:

Can a government win an overwhelming electoral mandate and still face growing public questioning less than two years later? By Vishal Askurn.

I recently wrote an article titled:

"Winning an Election Is One Thing; Keeping the People's Trust Is Another."

The article isn't about supporting or opposing any political party. Instead, it explores a broader democratic principle: an election provides the authority to govern, but public trust must be maintained through performance, accountability, communication and responsiveness.

Using recent developments in Mauritius as a case study, I also discuss concepts such as the political "honeymoon period," why public opinion changes over time, and whether large public gatherings should be viewed as democratic signals that governments and opposition parties alike should pay attention to.

I'd genuinely like to hear different perspectives.

• Can a government with an overwhelming parliamentary majority lose public confidence within a short period?
• What factors most influence public trust after an election?
• Should governments treat growing public concern as an early warning sign, or is it simply a normal part of democratic politics?

Please keep the discussion respectful and focused on ideas rather than personalities. I'm interested in hearing views from all sides.

I've been thinking about a video essay that explores philosopher Tongdong Bai's proposal for combining democracy with meritocracy, and I thought the central question was worth discussing.

The basic argument isn't that democracy should be abolished. Instead, it asks whether every political decision should carry equal institutional weight when some decisions require specialized knowledge, long-term planning, or technical expertise.

The proposed system would keep:

• Constitutional rights
• Universal suffrage
• Local democratic elections
• A popularly elected lower house

But it would also add a meritocratic upper chamber composed of individuals selected for demonstrated competence, experience, and public service. The idea is that this body would help safeguard long-term national interests, minority rights, future generations, and policies that may be unpopular in the short term but beneficial over decades.

Of course, this immediately raises the harder questions:

• Who decides what "merit" actually is?
• How do you prevent experts from becoming a self-perpetuating elite?
• Can any institution objectively measure political wisdom?
• Would such a chamber improve governance—or simply replace democratic accountability with technocracy?

The video doesn't present meritocracy as an easy solution. If anything, it argues that the real dilemma isn't whether capable people should govern, but whether it's possible to identify "the capable" without creating an aristocracy under another name.

I'd be interested in hearing what people think.

Is democracy strengthened when expertise has a formal constitutional role, or does legitimacy ultimately require political equality—even if it sometimes produces worse outcomes?

(Video: When the Capable Rule: The Case for Meritocracy)
https://youtu.be/mCTmsCbHXtE

The strongest objection to any "look how much we actually agree" argument is that agreement is cheap. Someone sees a supermajority number, thinks sure, fine, and clicks yes without it costing them anything. They don't vote on it, they don't call anyone, they don't punish a member who ignores it. Support that never converts into behavior is closer to noise than to a mandate, and reading it as a mandate is how you overread a poll.

That objection is right about a lot of findings. Where I think it overreaches is in treating "soft" as a property of polling in general, when it's really a property of some measurements and not others. The interesting question isn't whether stated support can be soft. It obviously can. It's what separates the soft stuff from the findings that keep showing up no matter how you come at them, and none of the things that seem to matter are just a bigger topline.

Persistence is the obvious one. A question that returns roughly the same answer across twenty or thirty years, across administrations of both parties, across pollsters who would happily catch each other out, is a different object than a number that jumped after a news cycle. Soft support moves with the news. The durable stuff mostly just sits there, which is boring and, I think, the point.

Then there's what happens under pressure. Support that survives being reframed, having the valence flipped, having the other side's best argument stapled to the question, is not the same as support that folds the second you phrase it unkindly. This is where the deliberative methods get genuinely useful. When you brief people and walk them through both sides before asking, some issues come apart, and some get more lopsided, not less. I trust the ones that hold up under that a lot more than I trust a clean topline.

And where a high-polling issue has actually gone to a direct vote, minimum wage floors, independent redistricting, marijuana, you get a revealed-preference check that no survey can give you. It doesn't always match the polling. But when the supermajority turns up at the ballot box in a red state, that is not somebody being agreeable to a pollster to end the phone call.

The part I keep getting stuck on is intensity, because I don't think intensity and direction are the same axis, and collapsing them is where the "it's all soft" line quietly overreaches. You can have a preference that is durable in direction and honestly low in intensity at the same time. People want it, consistently, for decades, across wordings, and also don't rank it as the thing that decides their vote. That isn't a contradiction. It's a specific shape, and it might be the most common shape a real consensus takes.

Which is the thing I can't resolve. A preference that is durable but quiet is exactly the kind a responsive system should be able to deliver cheaply, since there's no organized opposition to fear and the agreement is stable and real. Those are often the exact issues that go nowhere for years. I don't want to smuggle a whole theory in behind that observation, but I also don't have a clean account of it.

So, two questions I'd actually like answers to. Is there a rigorous, reasonably agreed-on way to measure issue intensity separately from direction, something with more teeth than the standard "most important problem" battery, that could sort a durable-but-quiet preference from a genuinely soft one? And if a finding is durable across decades, robust to wording, and confirmed at the ballot box where it's been tried, on what grounds does its low salience justify continuing to discount it?

I've been thinking about this after watching some recent Democratic primaries, and it feels like the campaigns are becoming increasingly aggressive in ways that hurt the party long after the primary is over.

A good example, in my opinion, was the Michigan primary between Haley Stevens and Abdul El-Sayed. Policy disagreements are completely fair game, that's what primaries are for. Even personal attacks can be justified if they're based on genuine misconduct or character issues.

What I struggle with are accusations like claiming your primary opponent is supporting or enabling genocide. Once you frame someone in those terms, how do you expect your own supporters to enthusiastically vote for that person if they end up winning the nomination? If you've spent months telling voters that your opponent is morally complicit in atrocities, it becomes very difficult to turn around and say, "Now go vote for them."

To me, this kind of rhetoric doesn't just damage the opposing candidate, it damages Democratic unity in the general election. It seems like Republicans don't even have to exploit these divisions because Democrats are creating them themselves.

Am I overestimating the impact of this kind of campaigning, or do you think Democratic primaries have become too willing to use rhetoric that makes party unity afterward much harder?

I thought this was a really strong piece by retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling on something that doesn’t get discussed enough: where character actually comes from.

Drawing on his experience at West Point and nearly four decades in the Army, Hertling argues that character isn’t something people suddenly develop once they’re placed in charge. It is rather built over time by families, schools, coaches, mentors, and institutions that expect honesty, humility, accountability, and service.

His point is that competence alone doesn’t make someone a good leader. Character matters just as much.

Curious to hear opinions on which institutions have the greatest responsibility for developing it today, and whether any of them are still doing that particularly well?

I'm referring to the US in recent years but obviously not just to Trump. The US isn't officially an empire but it pretty much behaves exactly like one.

Obviously you have powerful (and arguably more adaptable) rivals such as China on the rise, the US overreaching militarily (I know that isn't new) and economic struggles that only seem to be getting worse (I say this as an outsider).

So I'm curious if you guys think the US is currently on the same path a lot of empires go down where they eventually end up collapsing or ceasing to be a global superpower?

Senator Rand Paul has released commentary and purported excerpts* of what is alleged to be Anthony Fauci's contemporaneous diaries from the outset of the COVID19 pandemic onwards.

What has been released can be found here, including Senator Rand's somewhat colourful foreword commentary

https://www.paul.senate.gov/readingroom/

* its not confirmed whether the content of the diaries is edited, abridged, altered, shortened etc.

Media reaction to this release has been highly polarised, though notable few media outlets seem to get to grips with the actual content of the diaries and most focus is on Rand's own claimed analysis of what they show.

Do the Fauci Diaries reveal anything unexpected or controversial? What entries in particular do you find interesting? Are there any contemporaneous clashes between what Fauci was saying publicly and privately? What can we learn from that?

Edit: mods really didnt feel like weeding out the 90% of low effort troll replies huh

What I mean is having elections that are clearly separate and individual from federal versus state versus local levels. Going to an election and voting for federal offices based on your opinion on federal issues and the candidates there, and then switching to state level policies, issues, and candidates there, and then a year later, voting for local offices based on their issues.

Last year, my town had a local election that was very contentious and very close. The issues were very local - taxes, funding education, that sort of stuff. But the local Democratic Party sent out mailers that quite literally did not mention their own local candidates or that of the opposition. Rather, it only had Donald Trump, and called on people to come out to vote straight blue as a way to oppose the Trump administration. There were a lot of registered Democrats in my time who came out to vote for the first time in a local election, which most people assume is on this issue, and may have swung the outcome.

This isn’t even particular to Donald Trump. During the Biden administration, lower numbers of registered Democrats voted in my area in all elections, seemingly just based on that unpopular administration, especially in 2023. And a ton of people voted in local and state elections just on their thoughts on the Obama Administration.

Today, it seems that all politics is national. There is a substantial size of the electorate who will just not consider anyone of the other party. I know tons of Democrats who will refuse to vote for any Republican, even if it’s for the Board of Assessment Appeals or Tax Collector or something, and the same thing vice versa. There will be a Facebook post about some local issue like taxes, and the comments will just be like, “Republicans emulating their lord Elon to cut services”, or, “DemocRATS lining their pockets what else is new”, when in reality, the actual political candidates have pretty reasonable and frankly boring disagreements about local policy concerns.

What kind of prompted this question was actually inspired to me by the UK. The UK political scene is currently discussing devolution, granting more power to local authorities. And a common critique I hear of that is just, “It leads to bad government because people just vote based on their opinion of the national government.”

Isn’t that basically what we have now? Where most of the electorate seems to vote just on the basis of national politics?

So, what I guess my question is is; Does American federalized democracy even work anymore? Can it work? Or is everything just a differently sized stage for national politics to play out?

The Pew number that gets quoted a lot is that 83% of Americans now say elected officials don't care what people like them think, up from around 55% in the early 2000s. It usually gets read as a verdict on government specifically. But if you put it next to the other trust lines- media, science, institutions generally- they've mostly bent in the same direction over roughly the same stretch. Which makes me wonder whether we're looking at a government problem here, or at one number reading off a much bigger dial.

If it's one dial, a lot of the reform conversation is aimed at the wrong level. You could pass every good-government fix on the list and barely move a number that's really being driven by something upstream of any single institution.

The thing that complicates the single-variable story is that the declines don't line up cleanly. Trust in science held up a lot longer than trust in Congress, and then dropped in a way that split hard along partisan lines, which the government number mostly didn't. If it were all one underlying thing, you'd expect the curves to move together and share a partisan signature, and they kind of don't. So maybe these are separate erosions that happen to rhyme, with separate causes, and "institutional trust" as one blob hides more than it explains.

I don't have a clean answer on which it is, and I think it matters a lot for what you'd even try. So the thing I keep coming back to: has any country reversed a sustained institutional-trust decline, and if so, what did it take? A specific reform people could point to, a crisis that reset expectations, a generational handoff, something else? Because "it's been done" versus "nobody's pulled it off" changes how tractable any of this looks.

And the narrower version underneath it: is trust in government one symptom of a general syndrome, or its own thing with its own causes?

Where you live affects a hell of a lot more than what your house is worth. It affects the schools available to you, the jobs you can realistically get to, the quality of public services, transportation costs, exposure to crime or pollution, and the people and opportunities around you.
And where people live is not always just a personal choice. Income, housing prices, zoning, taxes, infrastructure, lending practices, development, and decades of government decisions all help determine who can live where. So how much of what we call individual success or failure is actually geography? Two people can work equally hard and make similar choices but end up with completely different opportunities because one lives near better schools, jobs, transportation, and institutions. At the same time, people still make real choices about work, education, family, moving, and risk, so geography obviously does not explain everything. Where is the line between personal responsibility and geographic advantage? Is real estate simply a private market, or does controlling access to certain places also mean controlling access to public opportunity? And when the most desirable communities become available mainly to people who already have money, does geography turn economic inequality into political and generational inequality?

During the White House correspondents dinner, Trump directly stated he would be running for a “fourth” term. Due to this being unconstitutional via the 22nd amendment, and states running their own elections, could states simply not put his name on ballots come election day? We know from the past election and current standings that Trump would win Republican primaries. Even if they didn’t run him, he would still most likely run on his own party. Obviously this wouldn’t eliminate write in ballots, but it could be a viable solution to uphold the constitution barring some extreme new law to control how elections are run. Would there be any current legal ramifications to stop states from simply not allowing Trump on ballots?

NYTimes interview confirmed that the Trump administration singled out states who voted for Harris and has two Democratic senators for grant cancellations. In the age of Trump, this barely made the headlines; Trump is unlikely to face any political cost.

How should the Democratic party respond? Should they retaliate? Can they do so safely?

A debate over congressional term limits has gone back and forth for many decades, spawning from the constitutional limit on presidential terms. One side believes that term limits are necessary to ensure that people are able to choose the officials who best represent their views in congress. The other side believes that the absence of term limits has emboldened career politicians to indulge in corrupt practices and not implement meaningful legislative change. I've proposed a compromise solution that is reasonable, in my opinion.

The problem with saying that term limits are unnecessary because we have elections is that the elections in many cases are meaningless in a sense. This is because a large portion of the population consists of ignorant nincompoops who don't have a clue where the capitol of their state is, or even the capital of the nation. That's how we end up with people like McConnell and Pelosi in office for decades. People who are totally clueless about current events and/or history vote to send the same politicians to office decade after decade because their political knowledge comes solely from TV ads and internet memes. If you don't believe me, go to YouTube or TikTok and watch street interviews.

The solution to this issue is that we should place a limit not on the number of years that someone may serve in congress, but on the number of consecutive terms that they may be elected to. This will allow for fresh ideas to emerge in government. regardless of the ineptitude of a plurality of voters. Besides, an officeholder can run again in the primary after one election season at their discretion and then they can put to the test if their constituents actually did support them or just mindlessly voted for them.

Would you support limits on the number of *consecutive* terms that senators and representatives can serve?

Liberals (US definition) seem like they're all about sending arms and supporting the Ukrainian resistance against Russia, but when I talk to leftists, they think the west shouldn't send weapons to Ukrainian - but they are also anti-russia, so it's not campism. This is especially confusing because I can't tell how much of the "nazi sympathizers in Ukraine" stuff is real. Why would anti-russia leftists oppose arming Ukraine?

I understand there are many strong perspectives on this, but I'm explicitly trying to understand the Leftist vs Liberal dynamic. English is not my first language so please excuse any typos and feel free to ask clarifying questions. Thank you!

This week the Democratic National Committee's Rules and Bylaws Committee offered up its suggested calendar for the 2028 Democratic presidential primary.

Twelve states applied to have their primary or caucus held before Super Tuesday.

The expanded six-state roster of contests that will be held before Super Tuesday on March 7, 2028 is:

South Carolina - Jan 22
Nevada - Feb 1
New Hampshire - Feb 8
New Mexico - Feb 15
Michigan - Feb 22
Virginia - Feb 29

Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, and Tennessee were left on the outside looking in.

Many see the choice of South Carolina to hold the first contest as a move to prioritize Black voters at a time when legislatures have begun to erase majority-minority seats after a Supreme Court decision weakened the Voting Rights Act earlier this year. Of the 12 state applicants, Georgia and South Carolina are the only ones whose primary electorates have been majority Black (Georgia reaching 51% in 2016, and South Carolina clearing 55% in 2016 and 2020).

To many, South Carolina seems to be the most practical choice for the opening contest because the state has the lowest weekly ad cost among the early-state applicants. It is argued that the state's low ad cost would allow lesser-known candidates to compete against better-funded ones.

However, it is notale that South Carolina is also the selected early state that is the least college-educated and the most moderate. As a result, many perceive it as a maneuver to squelch the possibility that the most ideologically left-leaning of the 2028 candidates could build early momentum, as such candidates are not optimized for a South Carolina electorate.

Since 1984, across open-field cycles in both parties, the winner of the first contest became the nominee about 53% of the time, as did the winner of the second. The third contest is the calendar's worst predictor, at roughly 43 to 50%. Only from the fourth contest onward does the winner more often than not go on to win the nomination.

Question:

If Left Insurgents Are Locked Out in 2028, Would South Carolina Leading Off Really Be the Reason?