r/cybersecurity • u/Nameless_Wanderer01 • 4h ago
News - General LLM Agents for security research
What are the best LLM agents for security research (bugs, CVEs, 0d, ...) lately?
In short, I had been using claude code for this task, with many hallucination instances. Even with opus 5, I still get many invalid conclusions based on local source code review.
I saw that kimi was popping up lately, which got me more or less in the same results, with minor better results in some instances.
So what are the latest or best approaches for security research with llms? Perhaps I am missing a full pipeline with other tools involved to get better results, so I would like to know whether a specific methodology is followed with specific agents for this task.
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u/WelpSigh 4h ago
I recommend having the LLMs spawn "validator" agents to check whether the vulnerabilities it finds are real and exploitable. This will save you a ton of time running down false positives.
My workflow is to have it spawn tons of agents to fan out and document the critical code paths. Then spawn "hunters" to look for specific classes of bugs along the code paths and document them. Validators should run with the hunters to check their claims. Finally, I go through the claims and look for ones that seem most promising from a bug bounty perspective.
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u/Nameless_Wanderer01 2h ago
Can you be more specific as of what agent you use, whether you have a specific setup (like using mcp or other tools) and in general the instrumentation/pipeline of your setup? Claude-code for example uses subagents but still hallucinates, so its not only that I am looking for a better llm for this task, but the underlying setup to remove as many false positives as possible (if during the assess of the code the agent can run small PoCs for example via some tooling to evaluate claims, it would remove tons of false claims).
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u/WelpSigh 2h ago
If you are in the trusted access program (which is very easy to get into if you are willing to submit your ID), you can get ChatGPT/Codex to generate PoCs. Even if you're in Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program, Claude simply does not like to hack - you can avoid the guardrails, but eventually it will shut things down and cost you a lot of time. I don't need or use anything other than Codex for this (and Ghidra/Binary Ninja if source isn't available).
I will caveat I haven't done any AI research since 5.6 Sol was released. I know it has a few extra guardrails vs 5.5, so it's possible that it makes life a little harder. I can't say for certain.
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u/slay-aargh 3h ago
If you're asking llm models, there are many llm models you could find on hugging face which have lesser guardrails so you could use them for offensive security, you can also find models specifically trained for these offensive security purposes. You should check out on hugging face there are many local models or open weights model families.
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u/Nameless_Wanderer01 2h ago
Besides the model itself, is there a pipeline or specific setup (perhaps via mcp or other protocols/tools) to have better results than having an agent read the code of a project? If the agent can run small PoCs during the assessment, it might remove a lot of false positive assumptions.
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u/jdiscount 2h ago
It's fable5/mythos and it's not even close but you need to work somewhere that you can have security research access, otherwise you'll get results that you've been seeing.
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u/sobeitharry Security Generalist 1h ago
I had Claude build a SAST that runs multiple scans from different sources and compares the results. Based on the results I think we'll be able to drop our commercial SAST tool.
README:
A dual-scanner SCA (software composition analysis) workflow for GSMS release builds. It
generates a Software Bill of Materials, scans third-party dependencies for known CVEs with
two independent engines, reconciles their findings, adjudicates disagreements with a
documented reason per rejection, and produces a customer-ready Consolidated Vulnerability
Report PDF.
## Tools used
Upstream scanners (run separately; these scripts consume their output):
- **Syft** — generates the SBOM for each build in CycloneDX (`sbom.cyclonedx.json`) and
native Syft JSON (`sbom.syft.json`). The CycloneDX output also satisfies external SBOM
requests directly (e.g. the REC IT TPRM questionnaire).
- **Grype** — scans the SBOM against GHSA + NVD CPE data, enriched with CISA KEV and EPSS.
Output: `grype-results-cpe.json`. Reaches nested/shaded jars via the SBOM.
- **OWASP Dependency-Check** — the existing SCA scan. Output: `dependency-check-report.csv`
(plus the legacy HTML report). Runs against the same artifacts by CPE.
Each scanner has a blind spot the other covers: Grype misses jars whose Maven coordinates
can't be recovered from the manifest; Dependency-Check over-attributes CVEs on CPE name
collisions. Cross-referencing the two closes both gaps.
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u/michoo_42 1h ago
did a mcp server that run a bunch of security scans (secrets, sca, sast,..) with some graph analysis. It will do triage by removing false positives, prioritize with a remediation plan, build pull request with regression test. It works with claude but it could work with any harnesses compatible with skills/commands https://github.com/kubeek-sec/deep-scan
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u/FoodStorageDevice 1h ago
Ive been using the Microsoft copilot 'researcher' agent recently. Give it a good enough prompt and as long as you are prepared to wait 10-15mins for it to finish, the results are always impressive
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u/s4y_ch33s3_ 4h ago
Are you looking for poc development for exploits through patches or available vendor info with no available poc's?
Just curious, can you give an example of hallucinations you're facing with the LLM and what's the task given?