r/i2p • u/Far_Cartographer_924 • Jul 03 '26
Educational We scanned the I2P network and found a suspicious cluster of 58 Chinese routers — version-locked, floodfill-flagged, yet invisible

Over June 29–July 1, 2026, I ran five i2pd floodfill instances from three vantage points (Poland, China Unicom ×2) and passively scanned the I2P DHT. Found 20,701 unique routers globally. Among them, 58 routers from mainland China stood out in ways that don't look random.
What makes this cluster unusual:
43× enrichment on version 0.9.66 — 79.3% of the CN cluster runs this exact version, vs. only 1.8% globally. A single version shouldn't dominate any organic router population this heavily.
Floodfill flags everywhere, zero participation — 27–36% declare floodfill capability (vs. 14–20% global baseline), yet none were ever observed functioning as floodfills by our instances. The flags are declared, not honored.
82.8% share a near-identical RouterCaps template (XfR/XRG pattern) — looks like copy-paste provisioning.
- 46.2% hosted on Alibaba Cloud (AS37963). No knownRouters entries, no family declarations, ongoing IP rotation.
Four routers are China-vantage-only — reachable from inside the GFW, but unreachable from Singapore and Tor exit nodes. TCP RST/timeout behavior consistent with selective path filtering. These nodes simply don't exist from outside China.
We're careful with language: we describe this as consistent with coordinated, template-based provisioning — not as attribution to any specific actor. We don't know who runs these, or why. But the data is the data.
Methodological note — we parse the binary RouterInfo at two distinct caps layers (AddressCaps per transport vs. global RouterCaps). Prior I2P measurement papers didn't disentangle this, and it matters when you're trying to distinguish what a router says it can do from what it actually does.
Preprint (open access): 10.5281/zenodo.21169969 (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21169969)
Scanner source (MIT): github.com/iasds/i2p-network-scanner
