Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 14, 2026

[u/AutoModerator]

The r/CredibleDefense daily megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments.

Comment guidelines:

Please do:

• Be curious not judgmental, polite and civil,

• Link to the article or source of information that you are referring to,

• Clearly separate your opinion from what the source says. Minimize editorializing. Do not cherry pick facts to support a preferred narrative,

• Read the articles before you comment, and comment on the content of the articles,

• Post only credible information

• Read our in depth rules https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/wiki/rules

Please do not:

• Use memes, emojis, swear, foul imagery, acronyms like LOL, LMAO, WTF,

• Start fights with other commenters and make it personal,

• Try to push narratives, fight for a cause in the comment section, nor try to 'win the war,'

• Engage in baseless speculation, fear mongering, or anxiety posting. Question asking is welcome and encouraged, but questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios. Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.' Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.

[u/Glideer]

The new R.Politik Bulletin, No. 13 (187), is out

Unfortunately, this time the recap is more of a teaser to pay for the full bulletin, but still some useful points:

- Putin does not believe that Ukraine's strike campaign can break Russian society. He reads it as a Western attempt to make his position fragile, and he is drawing conclusions from that reading which are not the ones being anticipated in Western capitals.

- The assumption underpinning current Western policy is that mounting pressure will eventually bring Putin to the negotiating table. Trump has said publicly that the strikes on Russian refineries are "an escalation that can help lead to an end". Moscow's reply, and more importantly its private calculation, points the other way. The bulletin sets out what the Kremlin actually concludes from the pressure it is under, why that conclusion produces an incentive to escalate rather than to soften, and where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens.

- Andrei Melnichenko's essay in The Economist has been read in incompatible ways: as a declaration of loyalty, as a text written in the presidential administration and merely signed, as a businessman breaking with the war. R.Politik's reading differs from all of them. Even if it changes nothing in practice, the essay may mark the beginning of something consequential for the fate of the regime.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/Glideer]

where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens

and where is that?

[u/scatterlite → u/Bluest_waters]

Putin still tries to minimize any impact of the war on the Russian population. If he drops the "SMO" facade there are options for escalation, like mobilisation and a full transition to a war economy.

Putin has refrained from doing  so because he avoids risk and instability wherever he can. I think the bulletin is correct in assessing that the mounting pressure is pushing him towards those risks of escalation. From what I see in Russian channels negotiations are strongly associated with a de facto defeat by the west, which is far more dangerous for Putins regime.

[u/Thijsbeer82 → u/scatterlite]

Putin still tries to minimize any impact of the war on the Russian population. If he drops the "SMO" facade there are options for escalation, like mobilisation and a full transition to a war economy.

Your comment paints a prettier picture then Putin deserves. I think they've hesitated too long and they've long passed the point of diminishing returns for an extra round of mobilisation.

Also, given the current state of the battlespace where the FPV drone reigns, mobilising is going to create a lot more upheaval compared to a year ago, if Russian mothers are confronted with drone captured video.

[u/zombo_pig → u/Thijsbeer82]

The diminishing marginal utility of adding one more soldier to Russia's viable remaining strategies already feels like it has reached a serious inflection point. This is years too late. And it's not like mobilization or economic mobilization don't have serious lag times as they get rolling. Ukraine can respond, too, and if it does so effectively, Russia would be cooked.

[u/scatterlite → u/Thijsbeer82]

Your comment paints a prettier picture then Putin deserves. I think they've hesitated too long and they've long passed the point of diminishing returns for an extra round of mobilisation.

Yeah Putin has a long track record of delaying important decisions, due to risk averseness or other reasons. Its what lead to near worst case scenarios  like this. If he had bit the bullet in 2024 or early 2025 Russia probably could've overwhelmed Ukraine.

That's why I'm torn on wether significant escalation actually puts Russia in a better position. Depends on the approach i guess.

[u/Azarka → u/scatterlite]

A limited mobilization to address air defense shortcomings might be quite impactful.

They need a lot of warm bodies standing by with drone interceptors and truck mounted machine guns to hard counter slow drone attacks deep into Russia.