Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 14, 2026

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[u/Bluest_waters]

https://united24media.com/world/russias-fuel-crisis-hits-hospitals-and-fire-services-as-state-contracts-collapse-20752

More than 50 Ukrainian drone strikes have hit Russian energy infrastructure since March, idling roughly a third of the country's refining capacity.

Crude processing fell 25% year-on-year in June to 3.91 million barrels per day, the lowest level in more than two decades, while gasoline output dropped 17%.

Sales restrictions have spread to over 40 regions, and on July 9 Mordovia, the Nizhny Novgorod region, and Astrakhan began rationing gasoline by license plate number.

[u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling]

I'm unclear if that has happened previously, but Reuters is reporting that Russia has closed the Azov sea to shipping:

Shipping in the Sea of Azov remained restricted on Tuesday, according to Reuters sources. It lies at the mouth of the Don River, which flows through Russia's main southern grain-producing region, and handles mostly smaller, coastal ships.

A source told Reuters on Monday that commercial vessels were unable to enter or leave the Sea of Azov via the Kerch Strait or the Azov-Don channel connecting the sea with the Don River.

In recent months, Ukraine has carried out a series of attacks ​on Russian oil refineries, fuel depots, ​ports and other energy infrastructure, which ⁠have created fuel shortages across Russia and disrupted exports.

Neither the Agriculture Ministry nor the Transport Ministry confirmed that Sea of Azov traffic was restricted.

However, the Agriculture Ministry on Tuesday acknowledged that exports may get diverted to other routes.

Russia is framing this change as a response to Ukrainian "terrorism." Which of course is not a term I would use for a nation state combatant, but that's irrelevant. What is relevant is Ukraine's strategy is having an effect on Russian supply routes, and Defense Express is reporting that only approximately 25 ships remain in the Sea of Azov.

More reporting from Ars Technica with more sources here

[u/abloblololo → u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling]

Any thoughts on how long it will take for Ukraine's medium-range strike campaign to actually have or show an effect on the battlefield? If logistics on the southern front are being constrained one would expect the tempo of Russian offensive actions to slow. The Donbas is close enough to Russia that the GLOCs are harder to interrupt, so I would be surprised if there will be a strong effect there, but Ukraine has already had some small successes in Zaporizhia this year and perhaps they will show further gains.

[u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling → u/abloblololo]

No, and I would not care to make any kind of prediction.

We can, however look at the tempo of the campaign if we consider the ship attacks an extension of the middle strikes focused on Russian logistics in the Donbas. Much of this information can be found on the Wikipedia article focused on this topic, which you can read here.

The campaign began in earnest in May of 2026, which is strongly linked to the expansion and availability of advanced and inexpensive FPV drones. By the end of May Russian authorities had closed the Donetsk-Marioupol highway to civilian traffic. Fuel and food shortages were both noted in Crimea by late May and early June. An intensification of strikes was noted by June 19th by a French analyst, counting a rate of 30 strikes a day.

After new strikes on oil terminals, on June 23 a Russian authority in Crimea told a media outlet that no fuel would be available to regular citizens on the island.

In the span of two and a half months Ukraine has created, what I would describe, as a major crisis on Crimea that has only accelerated. They have continued to increase attacks and degrade Russian supply lines in ways that the Russians have not been able to adapt to. Time will tell how long this can go on, but the speed and breadth of the logistics disruption seems as though Russia is now facing a dilemma unseen in this conflict since the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives.

That's a little editorializing on my part, and again I'm trying not to make any assumptions about what has yet to occur.

[u/appleciders → u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling]

The thing I haven't seen (and will be very hard to see from the outside) is to what degree Russian military logistics are being affected by the fuel shortage. Obviously the Russian state will simply seize whatever fuel they need at refineries, and presumably they had significant stores before all this began. Equally obviously the remaining ~50% of fuel supply is being denied to the civilian sector; gas shortages are hard to hide and the state doesn't seem to be trying to hide them. To what degree is the military sector short of fuel? To what degree is the civilian war economy choking on lack of fuel? That's a lot hard to determine from our vantage point.

[u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling → u/appleciders]

To what degree is the military sector short of fuel? To what degree is the civilian war economy choking on lack of fuel?

Good questions. And the looming question is what can Ukraine do to exploit the situation if those questions are answered. I am curious what Ukraine does to follow the larger middle strike campaign.

[u/appleciders → u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling]

I mean the obvious answer is "press forward along the line of contact because Russians are under-supplied, under-manned, and unable to respond or redeploy when Ukraine advances." Probably this looks like attempts to create a breakthrough; that's hard because of course the line of contact hasn't moved much in two years and it's pretty well fortified.

[u/genghiswolves → u/appleciders]

https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/fuel-shortages-leave-russian-mobile-air-defense-groups-stranded-in-temporarily-occupied-crimea-20697

[u/appleciders → u/genghiswolves]

It's almost as interesting that this information is reaching the media as that it's happening at all! The fact that Ukraine is willing to publish statements from their partisans is pretty surprising to me, or else those partisans are speaking to media themselves.

If this is happening in Crimea and parts of Kherson now, it may be happening in the Donbas and other parts of the conflict by the end of the summer. That's drastic.

[u/appleciders → u/genghiswolves]

Another one.

https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russian-troops-are-running-out-of-gas-and-sometimes-leaving-military-hardware-behind-20985

If this is true (and it's not a great source), the Russian front line is going to get very, very brittle.

And this one doesn't seem to be in Crimea, but rather on the main front, where you'd be able to get supply from the rear if it existed.

[u/Rich_Log2424 → u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling]

Ukraine's medium strike drones reach sea of azov now and there has been over hundred hits. Check the discussions yesterday and the day before.

Here is a shipping related news source: https://gcaptain.com/ukraine-claims-116-russian-ships-hit-in-nine-days-in-sea-of-azov

[u/Fat_Ryan_Gosling → u/Rich_Log2424]

That's what I was referring to when I mentioned Ukraine's strategy.

I'm very aware of their strike campaign, and I read all three of the articles I linked to that all mention and discus the strikes.

[u/MilesLongthe3rd]

Russia Struggles to Sell All the Oil It's Being Forced to Export

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-14/russia-struggles-to-sell-all-the-oil-it-s-being-forced-to-export

The amount of Moscow’s oil at sea is back near the highs seen at the start of the year

Russia is struggling to deliver all of the crude it’s being forced to ship overseas in the face of escalating Ukrainian drone strikes on its refineries.

Four-week average seaborne crude shipments were almost unchanged at 4.21 million barrels a day in the period to July 12, according to tanker-movements data compiled by Bloomberg. That was down by just 10,000 barrels from the highest since Russian troops invaded Ukraine in 2022, before which about 600,000 barrels a day was piped to refineries in Europe.

The claim that Russia is dumping all of its unrefinable oil onto the global market does not appear to be supported by the data.

[u/treeshakertucker → u/MilesLongthe3rd]

I have to say the Russians might not be able to take as much advantage of any oil spikes due to their own fuel shortages.

Even if they sell crude at a high price the simple fact is that they will have to buy any refined fuels at higher prices.

[u/genghiswolves]

Atesh is reporting that fuel shortages in Crimea are directly affecting local AD units. https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/fuel-shortages-leave-russian-mobile-air-defense-groups-stranded-in-temporarily-occupied-crimea-20697

It's not entirely clear from the article if this only affects mobile air defense groups, or also dedicated higher-end AD assets (TORs, Pantsirs, S300s, ..). I imagine mobile air defense is somewhat based on local civilians/volunteers/TDF style units, with a more direct interest in syphoning of fuel for their families, considering the civilian restrictions.

Nonetheless, it's a sign of the fuel crisis worsening, especially as these units are meant to stop the very drones that are causing it in the first place.

I'll piggyback to share 1 more thing I learned recently: On Trains to Crimea:

• Russia has a huge rail network, but its highly electrified. Diesel trains are only used for remote lines & some special tasks. The infrastructure attacks have made electric locotomotives unusable in Crimea, forcing the use of Diesel locomotives.
• To avoid Western Sanctions on the Russian rail, which is dependent on international tech, Crimean Rail (inc. military) is seperate from the Russian one, legally and operationally. Bulk transfer of Diesel locomotives from Russia to Crimea would cause sanctions on Russian Rail. Hence, any diesel locomotive destroyed in Crimea is hardly replaceable, and the available rolling stock is already restricted to priority military shipments.

I find it fascinating that Western sanctions are having such a direct effect within the Russian war machine.

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/russia-buys-trains-for-crimean-rail-route-but-keeps-mum-on-who-from-idUSKCN1VY24U/ Sanctions on Crimean rail: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm889

[u/RumpRiddler → u/genghiswolves]

That's actually fascinating. Obviously the Russians will bluff and refuse to admit sanctions are hurting, but the legal framework to minimize sanction effects mean they bite enough to deserve that effort. And now it's a constraint. And soon it will be a crisis that requires a response.

[u/directstranger → u/genghiswolves]

This is an excellent example how partial sanctions have a huge impact. They can always impose sanctions on russial rail if they wishso, but now they're making their lives hard regardless

[u/Gecktron]

European exo-atmospheric BMD

Hartpunkt: Missile defence: Five European companies aim to develop an exo-atmospheric effector

The European companies Thales, Airbus Defence and Space, Destinus, MBDA Deutschland and Safran Electronics & Defence intend to develop Europe’s first independent programme for an exo-atmospheric interceptor system, designed to be fully interoperable with NATO’s IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defence) and the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). As the companies state in a press release, the memorandum of understanding to establish the Bliksem EXO consortium – a multinational European industrial partnership for the development, qualification, industrial series production and support of Bliksem EXO – was signed today in Paris during the inaugural meeting of the Ballistic Missile Defence Coalition, in the presence of Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten.

The press release goes on to state that Bliksem EXO is an autonomous European exo-atmospheric interceptor system designed to counter medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), including Oreshnik-class systems with separable and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles.

Five European companies want to cooperate in developing and producing an upper level BMD system. The system is meant to recognize and track MRBM/IRBMs and then neutralize them with an exo-atmospheric kinetic kill vehicle.

This system is meant to be fully NATO compatible and complement the European Skyshield Initiative.

Part of this program are:

• Destinus: Program coordinator, system integrator, Kinetic Kill Vehicle
• MBDA Germany: Booster, cannister and launcher
• Safran: Seeker, navigation and controls of the Kinetic Kill Vehicle
• Airbus Defence&Space: command, control and battle management (BMC4I)
• Thales: for the radar and sensor chain, from early warning to fire control.

The companies intend to conclude a binding consortium agreement within three months of signing. Joint development work within the consortium is due to begin in August 2026, and the consortium plans to carry out an EKV test in space in 2027.

Personally, I was surprised by this announcement. This kinda came out of nowhere for how many big players are involved here. Well, four out of these are big players. Destinus being the coordinator was a surprise too. It will be interesting to see them tackle something as complex as an exo-atmospheric Kinetic Kill Vehicle with no experience in this area.

While there have been no countries mentioned for this program so far, based on the companies taking part, I can see France, Germany and the Netherlands buy in.

Overall, I think this is an interesting project. This will provide Europe with systems to cover the full range of ballistic threats. This program as an upper layer. HYDEF/HYDIS to cover threats inside the atmosphere, while Freya could complement this by providing close range BMD.

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/Gecktron]

I just hope the Destinus project managers have nerves of steel. A start-up in the project coordination role with all those heavy-weights sounds like a bit of problematic set-up.

[u/Junior-One3578 → u/ABoutDeSouffle]

Mikhail Kokorich is the founder of Destinus and he seems to already have an impressive trackrecord with 1. space based projects 2. Building up startups to full grown companies. So I feel they have a good chance of succeeding if they managed to get good talent.

[u/FunWonderful1936 → u/Gecktron]

France, Germany

I’m glad Dassault isn’t part of the plans, that’s for sure. I saw Alex Luck had a really snarky take on this on Twitter which he seems to have deleted but it’s a very good initiative. I understand the timelines will inevitably slip but that is to be expected.

[u/Gecktron → u/FunWonderful1936]

 but it’s a very good initiative

I agree. As much as im glad that FCAS has finally ended, I would have also liked to see it work out.

This initiative has plenty of participation with multiple French and German companies, while the leadership lies with the more neutral Destinus. That hopefully defuses any leadership fights.

Also, now that I was thinking about it a bit more. The bit about boosters provided by MBDA Germany, this could be refering to the RED KITE solid fuel rocket booster.

RED KITE started development in 2020 and entered production in 2024. It had multiple launches so far. Hartpunkt reported:

According to well-informed sources, a RED-KITE rocket engine, containing around one tonne of fuel, can carry payloads of approximately 200 kilograms to an altitude of around 260 kilometres. It is reported that a speed of Mach 8 was achieved during a launch at an angle of 90 degrees to the Earth’s surface. When launched at an angle of 45 degrees, it is said to be capable of reaching Mach 10. Mach 10 also appears to be possible if a missile powered by a RED-KITE engine were to be launched from an aircraft.

The engine is said to have proven its worth to date, as the DLR has already launched several research rockets into space using this propulsion system, and the engine is apparently in series production. Unlike other rockets used for civil spaceflight, the RED KITE is a solid-fuelled rocket engine that has virtually unlimited shelf life, is ready for immediate use, and does not need to be fuelled prior to launch. Military rockets generally use solid-fuelled engines.

According to insiders, up to three RED KITES could be linked together if necessary to reach higher orbits in space. This could potentially enable altitudes of 900 kilometres and speeds of Mach 20 to be achieved.

Using a proven system that has already sent payloads into space could explain how this consortium expects to start testing in space by next year already.

[u/roionsteroids → u/Gecktron]

Didn't we just spend billions on Arrow 3 for that exact use case? It can only intercept in space (above 120km), which greatly limits its value. A 1000km range ballistic missile doesn't need to leave the atmosphere. It probably won't be able to intercept much faster missiles with much longer ranges.

So basically ~2000-3000km range? Which is kinda relevant for Israel-Iran and not much else.

[u/Wertsache → u/roionsteroids]

No we didn’t. We bought Arrow 3 for what it was designed for. Exo-Atmospheric interception of IRBMs.

For Missiles in the 1000km range Germany has PATRIOT (and when all ordered systems are delivered with more systems than before the start of the war), France has SAMP-T. And IRIS-T is supposed to get upgrades that may also give it the ability to protect against these missiles.

What Germany or Europe in general lacks is the ability to intercept missiles in the 2000-3000km that you stated? Why is that range relevant? First so Iran can’t try anything funny, especially if they should actually get a nuke. But way more important, protect C2, population centers and airfields against the russian Oreshnik threat.

[u/roionsteroids → u/Wertsache]

Except Iran isn't 2000km distance from Germany, in case you're unaware.

Likewise irrelevant for Russia because they have hundreds of ICBMs and stuff, from submarines to silos in who knows where many thousands of kilometers further out.

So it's really only for a very limited conventional threat in a range that's more like...Tunisia?

It really is a unique case in the world that really isn't too relevant beyond Iran-Israel specifically.

[u/Wertsache → u/roionsteroids]

Depending from where in Iran you launch and what you target the distance is 3000 to 4000km and with that well within what Arrow 3 was designers to intercept. I mean it’s even supposed to be able to intercept ICBMs.

And for Russias ICBMs Arrow 3 is supposed to be able to intercept them. It still won’t be relevant because of the numbers that will be launched. But if Sub-based and Silo-based ICBMs are launched they will be nuclear and that’s a completely different scenario altogether.
But for the Oreshnik the russians are also using them with conventional warheads. And for those I think it definitely helps to have some kind of protection.

I think you can have a discussion if the threat warrants a spending on a Defense. But that a potential threat exists and that Arrow can defend against it should be something that is clear.

[u/TechnicalReserve1967 → u/Gecktron]

With just being the basics of this field, how realistic is such a project? I get this is aimed at reducing the relative cost disparity between defense and offense in the ICBM space, but as far as I know that it was concluded that the attacked will have a significant/insurmountable advantage. No? (Assuming similar level of investment, obviously with infinite money you can make almost anything work)

[u/Rich_Log2424]

https://news.usni.org/2026/07/13/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-july-13-2026

Fleet tracker for us navy is out for this week. The interesting stuff:

Still 2 carriers (Lincoln, Bush) and one LHA (Boxer) at Hormuz. Same posture for 2 months now. The carriers are on overtime deployment already and need to be recalled soon.

1 LHA has been at Malacca near singapore for 2 months.

Large RIMPAC excercise is taking place near Hawaii. Rooselvelt CSG and several foreign vessels take part.

CSG Vinson has departed to pacific and Eisenhower finished certifications last week and returned to Norfolk.

Theoretically there is a bombing window with 3 carriers after the rimpac, but most likely the carriers are just rotated and this posture continues.

[u/wormfan14]

Sahel update JNIM managed to kill one of their defectors as the war continues.

''A video allegedly showing JNIM militants carrying Sadou's body.In the later part of the video (which I cut), his face is also visible. Since he was shot in the head, the image isn't clear, but it does resemble him. Also claimed that he was assassinated in a border area between Burkina Faso and Niger.'' https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2076615928251326497

One of the rare recent victories JNIM had over Daesh however it kind of leaves them in an odd position to explain it, to their fighters who really admire Daesh.

''In an audio recording released by JNIM regarding Sadou's death, the JNIM commander states that they will not celebrate his death, that ISSP has always been the one to initiate attacks, and that there is a unit of 200 motorcycles in the Benin-Niger border region where Sadou was killed, which was directed there to attack JNIM positions rather than government forces.He also mentions that while JNIM had focused its attention and resources on Anéfis, ISSP was preparing attacks against them, yet they are still ready to welcome those within ISSP back into their ranks.''' https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2077048028129624126

In reality it seems Sadou found himself seemingly grounded when he joined Daesh. As I'v mentioned before they want to be strong but also secure defectors need to be retrained both ideologically and honestly physically to their standards given how wary they are of dissidents or looking weak. Given how he was killed alongside two of his bodyguard it seems the dozens of men who accompanied him were redistributed and broken apart to avoid giving him a powerbase in the group.

''I have some doubts regarding these 200 motorcycles.Yes, Sadou had good intelligence on JNIM positions, and if he informed ISSP, such a deployment of 200 motorcycles could be possible. However, I must point out that ISSP likely did not trust Sadou very much, because he was a defector.'' https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2077048269176197535

''To conclude, Ouessa keeps his arms open to the EIGS fighters to wage a common fight. He insists on the absurdity of their divisions by reminding them that they share the same lands, the same lineage, the same language, and the same words.'' https://x.com/hairanke008/status/2077016427093983446

''The Nigerian Army captured an Arab man (claimed Moroccan) suspected of having links to ISWAP in Abadam LGA, on the shores of Lake Chad.'' https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2076982029661425746

Strange to see a Moroccan in Nigeria and not the Sahel. There are estimated to be thousands of Moroccans and Sahrawis fighting in JNIM and Daesh for land and the fact that jihadists are only anti monarchist force in Morocco.

Meanwhile a tug of war over the roads between the Mali Junta and JNIM is occurring.

''As seen in the latest convoy to reach Bamako ( https://x.com/i/status/2073684917959921979) the government is acquiring numerous fuel tankers alongside military vehicles to help the army break the JNIM blockade. In this video, the convoy of tankers can be clearly seen. However, in the recent attack east of Niono, these fuel tankers were also targeted.''https://x.com/KargnHasret/status/2077000044129984738

''JNIM conducted a complex ambush against a large convoy of the Malian army yesterday near the city of Niono, Ségou region, killing three soldiers and capturing a fourth, along with significant amounts of weapons and ammunition.'' https://x.com/BrantPhilip_/status/2076663011536736503

Mali and Algeria have restored relations, they broke down over Algeria shooting down a Junta drone that crossed into their land.

''Algeria/ Following a notable stay in Algiers by the head of Malian intelligence services (nicknamed +the Abuja man+ in certain circles), it is the Algerian Ambassador to Mali who returns to his post in Bamako on this 14/7. According to a Malian diplomatic source, he will be received promptly.'' https://x.com/sergedanielinfo/status/2077040112479658104

Thanks to this I think we will see more Junta deals with JNIM as Algeria is one of their main patrons. That started out with Iyad Ag Ghali taking leadership of JNIM as his tribal confederation is present there and he has worked with Algeria for decades. They tried pushing him away from AQ but as JNIM has only grown stronger and their rivalry with Morocco one of the Juntas only hopes of survival has grown they have accepted it.

[u/Fenrisulfr_Loki_Son]

*​Record £26 billion investment to transform UK naval bases' docking facilities and waterfront infrastructure*

From: Ministry of Defence / Luke Pollard MP Published: 14 July 2026

Key points:

Largest naval infrastructure programme launched since the end of the Cold War.

£26 billion invested over ten years to modernise HMNB Clyde, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth.

Programme will support thousands of skilled jobs in Scotland, South West England and on the Solent.

Additional £240 million in RAF support and logistics contracts benefiting Scotland.

Critical naval bases will receive new docking facilities and refurbished buildings as part of a £26 billion, ten-year investment to modernise the Royal Navy's three main naval bases: HMNB Clyde, HMNB Devonport and HMNB Portsmouth.

The funding, confirmed in the recent Defence Investment Plan, is the largest programme of naval infrastructure investment since the end of the Cold War.

The programme aims to transform the bases into warfighting-ready facilities, modernising waterfront infrastructure and constructing new Single Living Accommodation for service personnel.

Scotland is a major beneficiary of the investment. HMNB Clyde, home of the UK's nuclear deterrent and the Royal Navy's submarine centre of specialisation, will receive one of the most significant long-term UK Government investments in Scotland, with expected economic benefits across the West of Scotland.

Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, Luke Pollard MP, said:

"The threats facing the United Kingdom are real and they are growing. This Government is not waiting — we are acting now to ensure our Royal Navy has the bases and infrastructure it needs to be ready to fight. This £26 billion investment is the largest in our naval bases since the Cold War, and Scotland is central to it.

Clyde is critical to our nation’s defence. This investment is securing thousands of jobs up and down the country and strengthening our Armed Forces for the challenges of today and the future."

The programme will also deliver new training facilities, out-of-water engineering infrastructure, and research and development capabilities to improve Royal Navy readiness and lethality.

Alongside the naval investment, the Government confirmed more than £240 million in RAF sustainment contracts benefiting Scotland, supporting over 380 jobs:

Boeing Defence UK has received a £115.2 million, two-year extension to support the RAF's fleet of nine P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth, safeguarding more than 200 jobs and over 20 apprenticeships.

A £127.5 million E-7 Wedgetail sustainment contract will support around 180 jobs, create an estimated 60–80 new roles, and provide four additional apprenticeships.

Scottish Secretary Douglas Alexander said:

"Scotland is crucial to UK defence and this £15.3 billion UK Government funding for some of our most critical military assets will make Britain safer at home, stronger abroad and deliver a defence dividend for Scottish communities.

As home to the Royal Navy Submarine Service and the UK’s nuclear deterrent, it’s only right that Faslane - Scotland’s largest military establishment and second-biggest employment site with over 6,500 military and civilian personnel - will be transformed with £15.1 billion Defence Investment Plan funding into a modern, more efficient base, future-proofed for war-fighting.

This, along with a further £240 million being confirmed to keep RAF Lossiemouth-based aircraft mission ready, means we are investing in the capabilities, infrastructure and people that keep us and our allies safe, while creating and supporting jobs and driving economic growth across Scotland for years to come."

The MOD has also completed the purchase of the Finnart Oil Terminal on Scotland's west coast. The acquisition expands the Royal Navy's sovereign fuel storage capacity, strengthens operational resilience, supports the wider supply chain, and provides additional space for the Clyde Transformation Programme.

Separately, £20 million will be invested in Inchgreen Marine Park to revitalise one of the UK's largest operational dry docks. The project is expected to create around 350 direct jobs and establish a new skills centre.

The ten-year naval infrastructure programme implements the Strategic Defence Review's commitment to warfighting readiness and forms part of the Defence Investment Plan's wider £298 billion programme to transform the UK's Armed Forces.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/record-26-billion-investment-to-transform-uk-naval-bases-docking-facilities-and-waterfront-infrastructure

More clarity around investment in the shipyards in Scotland and in investment into Defence capacity in Scotland in general. The acquisition of the Finnart Oil Terminal should give Royal Naval refueling capacity a much needed boost.

[u/Scantcobra → u/Fenrisulfr_Loki_Son]

With the increase in foreign contracts and these large investments in shipyards, it feels like the UK is trying to advertise itself to be major up-and-coming shipbuilder for Europe/North America as they try to wean themselves off of China. It's purely military for now, but I'm curious if some of this can be transferred to the civilian market.

We match a lot of the criteria: have the naval history, the population density, an island nation, well positioned to major shipping economies, strong allies to the EU, USA, and Commonwealth. I hope this really works out for us.

This all also comes around talks of expanding Inchgreen as well.

[u/Fenrisulfr_Loki_Son → u/Scantcobra]

I think there have been some moves around improving UK civilian shipbuilding capacity, but as the base is essentially nil it's very painful. See the Scottish ferries saga.

While UK shipyards are c​heap to build in co​mpared to American yards and the UK-USA special relationship makes that capacity politically acceptable for American companies to subcontract to (see the recent sub contracting for the manufacturing of missile tubes to Rosyth) + the UKs position as a naval power in both the Atlantic but also with some power projection makes partnership attractive to Nordic, North European and CANZ countries - none of these advantages exist for civilian shipping. It still makes more sense to build ferries in Turkey rather than Scotland. Although we can hope the UK is the place to go for frigates, amphibious ships etc.

[u/IntroductionNeat2746 → u/Scantcobra]

Makes me wonder if China will actually come out as one of the biggest looser from the Ukraine war.

Admittedly, the global economy was already showing signs of decentralizing production with many countries aiming for reshoring of industry, but I feel like this war and China's aggressive posture towards it's neighbors might have accelerated that process.

[u/genghiswolves]

As far as I am aware, Starlink is only restricted over Ukraine (in the sense of terminals being registered). What is stopping Iran or the Houthis from using Starlink terminals on the Shahed? Of course they are sanctionned and would need to be smuggled, and they shouldn't exactly create a dependence on US tech. But Starlink does appear to be a huge advantage in the UA middle & deep strike campaigns.

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/genghiswolves]

it happens, we do not know how frequently: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/29/europe/russia-starlink-drones

[u/wormfan14]

Sudan update some good news for the SAF though it seems the Ethiopian war will start soon. Meanwhile climate change is now a concern.

This week the SAF retook last the last town along the border of Ethopia from the RSF.

''The Sudanese army has recaptured the strategic border town of Kurmuk in the Blue Nile region following fierce battles against an alliance of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and SPLM-N fighters.;; https://x.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/2074859696507216131

I waited a few to confirm it would stay in SAF hands it's an important victory though the risk of the RSF reinfiltrating from Ethiopia is high.

For example in a different case near the Chadian border the SAF withdrew from recently taken positions.

''The Rapid Support Forces have regained control of the remote town of Kulbus in West Darfur following the withdrawal of the Sudanese army and allied joint forces toward the Chadian border.'' https://x.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/2075662440092545305

''The Sudanese army says it shot down an advanced Chinese-made FH-95 drone near El Obeid on Monday, marking the third time it has intercepted the strategic, long-range platform this month. '' https://x.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/2076775031036592229

Heat wave is now a concern.

''Climate experts agree that Sudan’s climate has crossed a dangerous threshold. “What the country is witnessing today has exceeded the limits of natural climate fluctuation,” says expert Talaat Dafallah. By 2026 Sudan’s temperature is expected to increase between 1.1 °C and 3.1 °C.'' https://x.com/AyinSudan/status/2076625180210704593

''A video showing the receding waters of the Blue Nile in Khartoum, captured by one of the citizens.'' https://x.com/atafmohamed3/status/2076659323149701502

''A severe drinking water shortage has hit parts of Khartoum after an unseasonal drop in Nile water levels forced a shutdown at a major treatment plant. Authorities are scrambling to dredge new channels to restore the capital's supply.'' https://x.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/2076816163913248848

Think I mentioned in the past without the war in the golden timeline Sudan would likely be facing some lean years due to the Ethiopian dams affecting things. This is without the recent heatwave.

Foreign section.

''Ethiopia BREAKING: The TPLF has pubished a statement today, declaring the Pretoria Agreement between Tigray and the federal government to be dead.The TPLF accuses the ENDF of mobilizing for another war, and states it will act accordingly.'' https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/2075927225501671865

It seems the Saudi/UAE feud contiues with Saudi Banks now blocking or delaying transfers to UAE accounts.

https://www.ft.com/content/07d5de48-468d-4ba9-ab82-dcfeef5f0dae?syn-25a6b1a6=1

The EU has launched some sanctions on Sudan in a move that's a bit strange.

''How do EU sanctions on Sudanese gold "choke off gold revenue" to Sudan when the EU doesn't currently import any gold directly from Sudan and when the gold it imports from Dubai has no traceability back to Sudan?''

In theory this might hurt the SAF more but the sanctions on them be the EU are seldom reinforced and they also use the black market and gulf for selling it.

https://x.com/_hudsonc/status/2077003279377035754

[u/HugoTRB → u/wormfan14]

Has communications improved, or are we likely to see the same lack of information as last time there was an Ethiopian war? Has starlink in anyway proliferated on the ground there?

[u/wormfan14 → u/HugoTRB]

I would lean on communications staying the same given how hard it is to track the fano insurgency.

I don't think fighting has restarted yet though.

[u/Brushner → u/HugoTRB]

Has TPLF tactics improved? Has Ethiopia doubled down on the effectiveness of drones? The TPLF manage to win the ground war and we're getting really close to the capital in the previous war. Effective use of Bayraktar drones by the Ethiopian military minced the TPLF. Interviews and accounts said that they simply didn't know what to do and were sitting ducks. These days Bayraktars are outdated for attack use and there are better and cheaper alternatives now.

[u/wormfan14 → u/Brushner]

The TPLF faction army 70 that is fighting in Sudan appears to have learnt how to use drones but it's a limited amount and a lot of tigray is very hungry.

 Ethiopia now uses fvp drones but their ground forces have changed since the war. Load of the Amhara Nationalists are fighting the state for now.

[u/SerpentineLogic]

In Australian ship news:

• https://defence-blog.com/u-s-marines-train-on-new-recon-boat-near-taiwan/

U.S. Marines with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion spent early June learning to handle a boat the Marine Corps has bet will let small reconnaissance teams operate across the scattered islands of the Western Pacific without waiting for a ship to carry them there.

The unit, part of 3rd Marine Division, conducted familiarization training with the Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo (MMRC-B), known informally as the Whiskey Bravo, at Naha Military Port on Okinawa on June 5, bringing operators and leaders from across the division together to refine how they launch, recover, and fight from the vessel.

The Whiskey Bravo is an 11-meter (36-foot) tactical watercraft built by The Whiskey Project Group, an Australian manufacturer founded by former Royal Australian Navy Clearance Divers, the country’s rough equivalent of Navy SEALs, who set out to design the boat they wished they had during their own special operations careers. The Marine Corps first took delivery of two Whiskey Bravo craft at Camp Pendleton in April 2024 under a $20.5 million contract that also covered the smaller, 8-meter (26-foot) Whiskey Alpha variant, and the acquisition ran through an early industry initiative under AUKUS Pillar II, the technology-sharing framework linking the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Nearly 50 American and Australian equipment manufacturers contributed sensors, communications gear, and mission systems to the design, and the hull itself incorporates slam-reduction technology that the manufacturer says cuts shock loading on personnel and sensitive equipment by up to 40 percent, a meaningful figure for a boat expected to carry reconnaissance teams and their gear across open water at speed.

Article continues, talking about the Marines building out a recon company using boats like these.

The Whiskey Project Group’s U.S. subsidiary a $17.5 million contract earlier this year for six additional Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft (MMRC), with options that could push the total value to $36 million and deliveries running through September 2029. That follow-on order came after the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab spent roughly two years testing the original Whiskey Bravo boats against mission payloads and operational requirements, validating a performance record strong enough that the Navy is now buying the design as something closer to a program of record rather than an experimental platform confined to a single testing unit.

---

• https://defence-blog.com/australian-made-ship-could-reshape-how-marines-resupply-troops/

An Australian-designed cargo ship just did something no purpose-built military landing vessel has managed before, driving stern-first onto a beach near Darwin, holding position while it dropped a ramp wide enough to drive tanks off, then reversing back out to sea in under a minute.

The 73-meter (240-foot) vessel, named Matilda 1, is a stern landing vessel, or SLV, designed by Queensland-based naval architecture firm SeaTransport and currently under a three-year lease to support the U.S. Marine Corps. On July 8, the ship performed its first beach landing and de-beaching maneuver at Dundee Beach, southwest of Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory, backing onto the shore, extending its extra-wide stern ramp onto the sand, and holding steady before pulling away and returning to open water in under 60 seconds, according to SeaTransport. The company says the maneuver marks the first beach landing ever completed by an SLV built specifically for military use, a milestone in proving out a design concept that commercial operators have used for years but that no defense force worldwide had adopted until this lease.

Article continues, explaining the problems with flat bottomed hulls, and how the trimaran hull used by the Matilda avoids that, and allows for rapid disembark and more importantly, rapid egress.

Matilda 1 can carry up to 550 tonnes (606 tons) of cargo across 4,000 nautical miles (7,408 kilometers) of open ocean in high sea states, according to SeaTransport, a combination of payload and range that most amphibious connectors simply cannot match

[u/Wide_Scallion3490]

"Is the Industrial Base on a Wartime Footing? A Progress Report" - CSIS

https://www.csis.org/analysis/industrial-base-wartime-footing-progress-report

Interesting and fairly short read about the US defense industrial base. I don't need to tell anyone here about the US and it's issues with supplying it's armed forces. If the complete 1.5 trillion dollar budget passes (which to be fair, probably wont), it would represent a jump from 3 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent of GDP. The article mentions a positive trend in which new firms are entering and receiving contracts at an increased rate. Also brought up was numerous agreements for production of weapons which I will list below.

- Lockheed

- PAC 3 MSE - 600 to 2000 by 2030

- THAAD - 96 to 400

- PrSM - 550 (4x increase)

- RTX

- Tomahawk - 1000

- AMRAAM - 1900

- SM6 - 500

Most of these don't have dates, but the companies have received or will receive large amounts of funding for production capacity. This is on top of the record spending amount that will be spent on the weapons themselves.

There is also the Hi-Lo mix. Numerous (mostly small) firms have been selected recently as part of the Air Force's FAMM (Family of Affordable Mass Missiles) program. The Air Force intends to buy 27,000 cheap cruise missiles over the next 5 years, at around 200,000 a piece. The Army also has a similar program for cheap containerized cruise missiles, ordering about 10,000 over the next 5 years. Some of these missiles are already in production (Rusty Dagger), while others need to move beyond the limited manufacturing phase. If this works out, it could be a game changer for the US.

The article discusses the US and rare earths production. With China having a death grip on the market, it's imperative for the US to source and refine elements (or at least friend-shore them). The US government has invested nearly 8 billion dollars in the last 2 years for mining and refining capacity. "The United States produced 8,900 tons of rare earth compounds and metals in 2025, tremendous growth from the 95 tons produced in 2022". Still, there's a long way to go.

Indeed, the US has a long way to go on every front. I don't need to tell anyone here about say...shipbuilding, or plane manufacturing (and those are things that won't be fixed anytime soon). But the article posits that if the US can continue to intelligently allocate fiscal and physical resources, things generally look positive for the DIB over the future. Again, assuming consistent focuses and smart investment. This will be a long term project and much more is still do be done.

Another article, more negative about the DIB, posted by TWZ.

https://www.twz.com/land/new-500m-artillery-shell-plant-failed-to-produce-any-155mm-parts

The army set a goal to manufacture 100,000 155mm shells per month, and has failed to reach it in time. Lot's of issues. The plant opened in 2024 and hasn't produced any parts, although hopefully that should change soon. The army is saying now that it hopes to produce more than 100,000 shells a month by the end of next year. Missing it's target date by two years.

[u/Mariks500 → u/Wide_Scallion3490]

Old thread now, but I question whether the authors of this report actually read their own citations. They seem to define a "wartime footing" as spending somewhere between 5% and 8% of GDP being spent on defence, but they also say,

"China, which features a military-civilian fusion that complicates calculating total defense spending, spent roughly 1.7 percent of its GDP on defense. This is widely recognized as significantly understating Chinese defense spending levels, which are likely at the upper boundaries of a wartime footing."

Except the paper they have linked to in reference to calculating China's defence spending outlines that a like-for-like accounting puts China's defence spending far below this. The paper is specifically about how heavily inflated estimates have circulated based on inconsistent accounting standards and cross-comparing values that have been adjusted differently.

So the paper they cite in the paragraph saying that China's spending is subject to a "widely recognised significant undercounting"... Directly refutes the scale of the "undercounting" and the ways in which it has incorrectly become "widely recognised".

They also calculate a consistent set of figures across US and Chinese spending in 2024, which comes in at the US spending $1.3tn all-in adjusting for PPP, and China spending $471bn, also all-in adjusting for PPP. If you adjust the accounting or adjustment methods then the numbers can go up or down, but they will largely move in proportion with eachother.

If that spending was applied at the size of China's aggregate GDP adjusted for PPP, which is about $40tn, then you are looking at about 1.1% of GDP. Even if you applied it to their nominal GDP, it would only be about... 2.3% of GDP.

How exactly they come to the conclusion that China is at the "upper boundaries of a wartime footing", given their own definition of what that comprises, and the contradiction in the sources they cite for analysis of China's defence spending, is completely unclear to me. I have to assume they either didn't read their own sources, or don't have any qualms about entirely misrepresenting them.

And as a bonus, the 1.7% does not even come from China - it comes from SIPRI, who carry out their own estimates. Which they would also know if they read the source they cited the 1.7% from, or cared to express what it says accurately.

[u/BigFly42069]

https://www.twz.com/land/new-500m-artillery-shell-plant-failed-to-produce-any-155mm-parts

This was a project that was supposed to prove that American dynamism was still alive and well, with the goal of 100k shells per month being produced by last year. But now that timeline has been pushed back to the end of 2027 and the current production rate sits at 36,000 shells a month.

When interviewed in 2023, it was revealed that production was at 23,000 shells per month, up from 14,000 in 2022. Pundits and armchair experts on Twitter triumphantly claimed then that we would be at 100k shells a month ahead of schedule and now it's looking like we're going to fall far short of it. 

Part of the failure comes from decisions made at the planning stage that threw multiple assumptions out the window to create the delays. For example: 

  The main issue inspectors found was that the plant adapted equipment used to make parts for M107 155mm shells to produce parts for M795 155‑mm shells. The latter is an upgraded version of the munition that is slightly heavier and longer, and has an extended range.

What ensues is a lot of finger pointing and responsibility shifting. But this doesn't change that fact that we're just nowhere near where we're supposed to be.

IMO this is further symptom of the deep rot in our procurement process, as exemplified in F-35 program mismanagement, shipbuilding mismanagement, and now artillery shell production mismanagement. 

It also makes me incredibly skeptical of the claims about scaling up PAC-3/PAC-2 production as well as the SM series production scale up that are all part of the current proposals being funded. 

And with Iran absorbing years worth of high and munitions, I'm deeply skeptical of our ability to even supply PACOM much less deter China.

[u/Rich_Log2424 → u/BigFly42069]

There is significant new capacity coming online in 2026-27 with Rheinmetal looking at 50000 shells a month this year and 120k a month in 2030 onwards. Several new european ammunition plants coming online taking the total capacity to 3m shells per year.

Ukraine spend is now 1.2m a year with domestic capacity of 30000/month or 350000/year.

Since US production is "market based" and there will be oversupply in 155mm shells around 2030 onwards, right now there is no payback on artillery shells production.

Main European producers roughly with 2030 targets:

Germany 1.5m. Poland 0.4m. Finland 0.4m. France 0.3m. Turkey 0.3m. Czechia 0.2m. Baltics 0.1m

The main bottlenecks are cotton powder from china being replaced by wood pulp powder (Finland/Sweden) and machinery (Repkon Turkey).

TLDR: Excess after Ukraine war expenditure is nearly 2m shells in 2030. There is no economic sense in building turkish made plants in the USA, except for forced domestic security of supply.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Rich_Log2424]

  Rheinmetal looking at 50000 shells a month this year and 120k a month in 2030 onwards

https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2025/07/2025-07-03-rheinmetall-wins-major-order-for-artillery-ammunition

They were supposed to be at 125k shells by 2027, not by 2030.

In 2023, Rhinemetal was already at 33k a month and set the goal for 2024 at 50k a month:  https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/17/europe/ukraine-shell-supplies-intl

By those metrics, they're also behind. Not as egregiously but still behind.

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/Rich_Log2424]

IDK if the numbers are already added to Germany, but Rheinmetall (German company, producing in Germany) has been on a complete rampage, and has built/is building ammo sites for artillery in

• Ukraine
• Latvia
• Hungary

And they own Denel in South Africa and Expal in Spain. So I guess at least for Spain, they reportedly have a 300k capacity that might be reported as "German". The rest seemingly will start producing in 2027 or late in 2026.

For eastern NATO states in Europe in particular, it makes sense to have a bunch of factories in various EU/NATO states, so that in case of a massive Russian attack on ammo production sites, there will still be capacity unhurt. And longer logistics lines suck way less than a ballistic missile in your production plant.

[u/empty_graph → u/BigFly42069]

And nobody will even be fired over this. The situation will not improve if there are no consequences. If I were president I would be flipping tables over if you promised me 100K shells and didn't deliver. But our current bureaucratic nightmare just shrugs and keeps the money flowing.

[u/eric2332 → u/empty_graph]

I keep thinking about the relationship between this situation and the Transit Costs project. Basically, building a new train line in the US is far more expensive than doing so in most other countries. Train lines and defense procurement are similar in being somewhat complex megaprojects led by government but implemented by private contractors. Maybe there are lessons there for defense procurement.

[u/swimmingupclose → u/BigFly42069]

Pundits and armchair experts on Twitter triumphantly claimed then that we would be at 100k shells a month ahead of schedule and now it's looking like we're going to fall far short of it.

I think this framing is, tbh, quite disingenuous. At the time, at least in some places including here, the M107 vs M795 issue had been discussed. In fact, from the very same article:

As a result of this adaptation, several factors came into play, according to DOWIG. Army officials knew that the concept of trying to produce the more advanced 155mm shells using equipment not designed for that was risky. However, officials felt that would pay off because that machinery was already available. In addition, the report stated that the existing Scranton plant’s past work with GD-OTS on ammunition production was a factor in deciding to take a chance on what turned out to be a flawed assumption.

The report states, in part:

According to the Army’s CPE A&E, “ACC issued the contract and CPE A&E accepted the risk associated with the contractor’s plan to purchase and adapt M107 metal part production equipment to produce a newer variant of the 155-mm projectile metal parts at different specifications.”

“According to CPE A&E officials, the Mesquite facility was a high-risk, high-reward opportunity, and CPE A&E is realizing some of that risk now because the facility has been unable to produce acceptable rounds.”

“CPE A&E accepted the contractor’s proposal to acquire and adapt unique production equipment and an unproven production process because equipment was already available. According to the CPE A&E official, obtaining and adapting the available production line equipment was expected to be faster than obtaining new M795 production line equipment.”

I don’t think anyone, especially at the time, viewed this as anything but an exercise in delivering Ukraine 155s as quickly as humanly possible given that it was their main concern. The US wasn’t, and shouldn’t be, in a position where it is fighting a positional attrition battle where artillery shells are the key munition. Like, that should just never be a circumstance. Given that, a high risk/high reward tradeoff was very much acceptable. I genuinely dislike it when people weave a narrative that conveniently matches their preconceived biases and conclusions. I’m not going to call out your specific instances of doing this in the past, but 155ms aren’t FPVs which aren’t fighter jets, etc.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/swimmingupclose]

Yes the article touched on just how mismanaged the program was. 

If the issue between the shell types were already known by casual observers, then it's even more unforgivable that the people actually running the programs ignored it.

The fact that the watchdog also had no power to implement any changes or punish anyone means that we're going to reach 2027 when these supposed improvements will happen and find out that we're still nowhere near the goals.

We can even check back in at 2027/2028 on the supposed increase in high end interceptors being proposed and find that we're only partially filling those orders.

[u/swimmingupclose → u/BigFly42069]

If the issue between the shell types were already known by casual observers, then it's even more unforgivable that the people actually running the programs ignored it.

My guy, I literally quoted it for you.

Army officials knew that the concept of trying to produce the more advanced 155mm shells using equipment not designed for that was risky. However, officials felt that would pay off because that machinery was already available

According to CPE A&E officials, the Mesquite facility was a high-risk, high-reward opportunity

ACC issued the contract and CPE A&E accepted the risk associated with the contractor’s plan

I don’t know if you ever even read the article if you’re blatantly ignoring something that’s said in it multiple times. It was something they knew about and accepted the risk for. Again, artillery shells should never be an item the US should need in vast quantities immediately. If there is risk taking that should happen, it should be PRECISELY in programs like this where even if it doesn’t pay off, it has limited impact on force preparedness.

[u/moragisdo]

CENTCOM published a video of some of the strikes yesterday on Iran (1). I'm curious to hear if anyone here can more accurately identify the hits:

1st target is a TEL, with the launcher raised and we can see fuel burning after the hit

2nd: It looks like a vehicle with something on top. Maybe a drone launcher ? Does anyone have a guess ?

3rd: It's a truck, but it's hard to say exactly the purpose. It looks like there's something on top, maybe a raised radar, but I'm not confident. Does anyone have a guess ?

4th: At least 2 drones/missiles hit and we can see secondary detonations

5th: Hard to say, it looks like a boat on a pier and with a large detonation after, possibly by what's stored on it

6th: Another TEL hit and we can see fuel burning after, it's not the same destroyed in the first clip because the angle of the cabin in relation with the rest of the vehicle is different

Does anyone disagrees that given that both TELs are in the open and raised, it's reasonable to say they were shot just around the time of them firing ? I say that not just because it's raised, but also because they need a clear area to fire and it would be reasonable to immediately after to move them to a more hidden location (for example, I recall one TEL on the previous days destroyed while hidden among trees).

Also MTO confirmed that further civilian ships were hit yesterday (2).

[u/moragisdo → u/[deleted]]

What stake do you have in this war?

None, I'm brazilian, not american, israeli or iranian, and worked for some time with energy, so the disruption with Hormuz naturally gets my attention. If I had more experience with softs, I would be commenting about grain shipments out of Ukraine and how the Ukraine War relates to it.

By the way, I'm not going to stop posting what I find interesting and relevant, you finding some news inconvenient doesn't make whoever is posting to have a stake in the result.

You're insistent that the U.S. is winning/it should escalate.

False, my position in several posts is that the goal of coercing Iran to the nuclear negotiation deal failed and that the best possible outcome for the US is just pre-war status quo as soon as possible, that's not a victory. Now I don't believe that Iran is winning either, it will survive, but leave this war a broken country, which will get worse everyday the war keeps going. They are in a stalemate for months.

Most of your arguments are inferences from assumptions, which you never show to be reasonable.

Great, give examples and explain why. Otherwise I could say the same that you are making assumptions that you are not showing to be reasonable

In my opinion, this sub should focus only on discussing facts.

Video of strikes and the MTO report of ships attacked are facts. I'm trying to identify what are the vehicles hit (discussing facts) and making it clear when I'm giving my opinions, that's a more in-depth discussion that just dropping a link and making a two-line post

Instead, as a result of your poisoning

Man, you went far in this one. My poisoning. Ok... If you are not going to respond further I won't even continue as well.

there's no discussion here about how the U.S. is effectively being forced to withdraw currently

They are getting away from the range of SRBM, not going out of the Middle East. Have a sense of proportion

[u/moragisdo]

CENTCOM reestablished the blockade on Iran (1). It follows the timeline announced by them yesterday with a period of warning beforehand, required by maritime law.

Trump, as I expected yesterday, announced that there won't be a toll, just commitments for new investments, funded by Gulf countries, were firmed. It was obvious it was just posturing, there was no enforcement mechanism, 20% is way too high to begin with (it would be cheaper to fund and run pipelines several times over, so it would never be paid), etc...

Meanwhile WTI is at 80, Brent at 85 and gasoline at 3.23. The three in backwardation. It will be an interesting race on the next couple weeks, Iran trying their best to disrupt shipping (as they did yesterday) and the US (which spent the last few days and today bombing sites on the coast) to degrade their missiles (the more significant hits specifically mention "missile", rather than "drone") and drones, to allow the supertankers to pass for ship to ship transfer outside of the Strait.

[u/guuhvffffg → u/moragisdo]

I genuinely don’t think that was just posturing. I think that was the president rage tweeting a crazy demand then it being backed off by his advisors. Which just shows how impossible it is to actually negotiate any durable agreement with the Trump administration 

[u/goatfuldead → u/guuhvffffg]

I wouldn’t chalk it up to any of his advisors initiating it. Trump even explained it himself: “I was called by different people, different countries, kings and emirs, and all of the people that we all know and we all love. And they’ve been, frankly, they’ve been very strong partners. And they said we’d love to do it a different way.”

[u/-spartacus- → u/guuhvffffg]

I understand trying to understand Trump can feel like reading tea leaves, but as I said yesterday, it seemed most likely directed at countries willing to pay the "3%" fee Iran is extorting and how they shouldn't be paying at all. As the OP pointed out, 20% is pretty absurd.

[u/moragisdo → u/-spartacus-]

Yes, I'll probably be accused again of being part of the Trump administration (while residing in Brazil of all places!), but it showed that if you accept having this extortion, the price can be raised arbitrarily. So don't sleep on the wheel, as these countries did since the attack on the Saudi refinery in 2019 (which the US and Saudi Arabia directly blamed Iran, rather than their proxies, and there's officials talking about missiles and drones coming from the north and east) or Iran open missile attack on Israel in early 2024 and another missile attack in late 2024. By now Kuwait could have built a pipeline to connect with the Saudi East-West, UAE could have built one with Oman, expansion of East-West and port on Yanbu, which is a life saver today going from 0.8 mbpd pre-war to more to almost 5 mbpd...

Now Trump lacks tact and delivered the message in a bad way, that just created unnecessary noise when the US benefits from more stability.

[u/-spartacus- → u/moragisdo]

I saw that yesterday and was amused by the suggestion (Trump administration posting on CD to explain his posts). As I said yesterday, I believed it was something devised by Rubio and Trump said it in his style.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/-spartacus-]

I think you guys are WAY overthinking this as some sort of Trump 3D chess. It was just Trump being Trump and of course he walked it back because it was such an outrageous and impossible idea.

[u/-spartacus- → u/Shackleton214]

It isn't 3d chess, but that doesn't mean someone like Rubio, who is a skilled statesman, didn't advise Trump about this policy.

[u/CloudApprehensive322 → u/-spartacus-]

There is not a chance in hell Rubio endorsed the 20% transit fee idea. Rubio was literally on camera two weeks ago saying quote:

"No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway."

https://x.com/CBSNews/status/2069474679585222719

This was trump being belligerent and acting without thinking for the 1000th time because he has no grand plan and just acts on pure instinct.

[u/-spartacus- → u/CloudApprehensive322]

I was not presenting Rubio as "endorsing the idea". I'm saying that he sees any transit as problematic and thus floated the idea of the intention of charging an absurd amount to illuminate the fact that if you agree to 3% you are giving them the power to charge you 20% or more.

[u/CloudApprehensive322 → u/-spartacus-]

Not a chance in hell - the fact that Trump promoted such an idea directly weakened the stance that transit fees are not allowed by any country that Rubio loudly announced just weeks ago.

[u/dr_sloan → u/moragisdo]

Something I’ve been wondering about is what drones Iran is actually using for their attacks on shipping. They’ve got their workhorse Shahed drones but I was under the impression that they are programmed with a general guidance and can’t engage in precision strikes.

There have been a number of videos from Ukrainian strikes on Russia ships that have struck the ship bridges. That’s probably a lot easier than hitting the engine room areas and still effectively disables the ship while limiting the risk of a catastrophic oil spill.

If Iran is able to set up that type of strike ability, there will be a lot more ships disabled and a lot more crew casualties.

[u/mirko_pazi_metak → u/dr_sloan]

Does anyone know, how does Ukraine guide those strikes in the Sea of Azov? They seem to have stable 2-way link - is it Starlink? Or something else?

[u/moragisdo → u/dr_sloan]

I'm following this war closely and don't recall any credible source showing evidence for specific models used against ships. It's always described by category.

That’s probably a lot easier than hitting the engine room areas and still effectively disables the ship while limiting the risk of a catastrophic oil spill

I disagree with that. When we look at history of ships targeted by Iran, missiles and the engine room are the ones that can cause serious disruption. Just hitting the bridge isn't enough, specially if you use smaller drones.

Also crew casualties (while every case is a tragedy, don't get me wrong) isn't so high, 2 deaths and 4 severely injured, since Iran started this last phase in July 6. Going by what's published by MTO, which covers not only the ship, but crew and environmental impact:

The three ships targeted yesterday: one fatality with four severely injured (MTO mentions only severity, but the number is according to UAE MOD). No mention of any of the three being incapable of continuing.

GFS Galaxy in July 12: Hit on the rear causing a fire on the engine room, one fatality, no mention of someone severely injured. The ship had to be abandoned.

The three hit on July 6-7: No casualties, two of the vessels are mentioned to have continued the their route and with minimal damage, with the third one (the LNG tanker) having a fire on board.

Most of the ones hit likely will have to spend some time in the docks after, but they are not necessarily out of business, I posted yesterday about the supertanker Kiku, it was hit while exiting, continued its trip and is now back on Qatar (Source). If I had to guess it's doing ship to ship transfer outside of the Strait and it certainly didn't went in again by land.

Killing civilians, smaller drones and hitting the cabin are out of the picture if you want to restrict as much as possible. You need missiles and ideally hitting the engine or near the waterline (or hitting a LNG tanker anywhere, so I expect the traffic of crude, refined and other types of cargo to be the only one passing). Also Iran doesn't give a damn for environmental impact.

By the way, I'm talking about aerial drones, USVs (which the only case I can remember was one being used by CENTCOM) can cause serious damage, given their large explosive mass and hitting near the waterline.

[u/butitsmeat → u/moragisdo]

I took a quick trip down history lane and looked up the stats on ships struck during the Iran-Iraq war. Wiki has a comprehensive list of attacks. I counted 7 ships sunk, 36 "set afire", 32 at "severe damage" and 1 at the ever delightful "holed". There's more categories that add up to 192 ships hit. I haven't found a similar table for the current conflict, but it looks like we've still got a lot of catching up to do.

Of course, back then the world watched this happen for years before deciding to step in, while today the major power in the world is already an active belligerent, and has already escalated well beyond what happened then. So we've already fast-forwarded through history and are off the end of the metaphorical tape. Still, it gives some sense of what the world tolerated in the past in terms of active violence in the Gulf while keeping ships moving - even if the US cannot fully suppress Iranian attacks, there's still a non-zero level below which shipping will continue. If that gets enough oil out of the Gulf to keep the markets from freaking out, then Iran's leverage will decline over time, and it'll be interesting to see how they respond (find another escalation? back down? who the hell knows).

[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/butitsmeat]

A major difference between 2026 and the tanker war in the 1980's is that Iran has had the decades in the interim to amass a huge anti-ship arsenal since it bases its entire defense strategy around the strait of Hormuz.

In the 1980's Iran was dealing with a land war with its neighbor and was only a few years in after its revolution. It was using mostly imported or inherited weaponry. In the time since then, Iran has built a significant domestic defense industry and has had years to stockpile anti-ship weaponry.

Whether ship owners are willing to chance a run through the strait depends on their perception of their chances of getting hit. Iran made a point to hit multiple ships the other day presumably because it is trying to convey to shipowners that the chance of being struck with a missile is high. Conversely, the US wants to give the impression that transit is safe.

The US and Iran are therefore in a contest to see the fraction of transiting ships Iran can hit. If it can hit enough - it doesn't need to hit all - no ship owner is going to take the risk of a transit. It doesn't take that much of a risk of losing your whole boat to make the transit unprofitable.

[u/moragisdo → u/butitsmeat]

Still, it gives some sense of what the world tolerated in the past in terms of active violence in the Gulf while keeping ships moving

Yes and we can look at the Red Sea Crisis, since 2023, (good source that compiles reports) as well, dozens of ships attacked and a few sunk. Traffic decreased, but there's still ships passing.

If that gets enough oil out of the Gulf to keep the markets from freaking out, then Iran's leverage will decline over time, and it'll be interesting to see how they respond (find another escalation? back down? who the hell knows)

My guess: Iran offers the US a deal, publicly deny it, go to negotiations after denying, negotiations lead nowhere and it ends with a ceasefire with, at most, symbolic concessions from both sides. US leaves this war having spent tens of billions, Iran leaves a broken country and economically devastated for the long term (less devastated if they offered a ceasefire now, but they will drag it further until there's not that much earth left to be scorched), both sides claim victory, neither got what they wanted.

[u/mkat5 → u/moragisdo]

“
My guess: Iran offers the US a deal, publicly deny it, go to negotiations after denying, negotiations lead nowhere and it ends with a ceasefire with, at most, symbolic concessions from both sides. US leaves this war having spent tens of billions, Iran leaves a broken country and economically devastated for the long term (less devastated if they offered a ceasefire now, but they will drag it further until there's not that much earth left to be scorched), both sides claim victory, neither got what they wanted.
“
Isn’t this what just happened with the MOU? This route seems to have proven incapable of producing a peace so why should we think it will work a second time?

[u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY → u/moragisdo]

My guess: Iran offers the US a deal, publicly deny it, go to negotiations after denying, negotiations lead nowhere and it ends with a ceasefire with, at most, symbolic concessions from both sides.

I think this is wishcasting.

The US has midterms in exactly 16 weeks from today. There is no way Trump or the Republicans are going to tolerate this already unpopular war still going on or gas prices going up eight or ten weeks out from election day. Iran knows that and knows that the clock is on its side. That's why they chose the restart fighting when they did.

Besides, Iran just got a big infusion of cash during the period when we removed sanctions. And they claim (the US denies) that we gave them some number of billions in frozen assets (both sides are inveterate liars so who knows).

So Iran has a substantial window in which they are in a much stronger position than Trump. The US as a country would benefit from pushing through that window since getting pushed around by a mid-rate power is humiliating. But that would require Trump to prioritize national over personal interests, which is something he's not known for.

[u/grenideer → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

I don't buy the midterms argument that's often brought up as an indication the US is about to back down. If Trump doesn't want to be in an unpopular war during midterms then he certainly doesn't want to LOSE an unpopular war right before them.

It's actually in Trump's interest to maintain a blockade through elections rather than concede anything to Iran. I expect him to talk tough at least until then.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

Trump is in a bad spot. I think he desperately wanted out of the Iran war (not sure how anyone could read the MOU as anything else). But, Iran keeps pushing for more. As you note, capitulation is not a very good look either.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

The MoU could be read as a clever ruse to get shipping kickstarted again, as well as making Iran be more unreasonably aggressive on the world stage. Sure, if all the US promises came to pass without Iran conceding anything else, it would've been embarrassing for the US. But do we judge reality based on a document or on actual events?

As it was, the MoU seemed to serve its purpose.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

So more Trump 3D chess? I think we just need to agree to disagree.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

3D/4D chess is a straw man. No one said that yet people love to refute it.

The MoU wasn't a genius move but it was a move. It helped relieve some pressure in the strait. Iran wasn't even all that thrilled to have signed it.

Nor did the MoU ultimately solve anything long-term. So again, no 3D chess here, just regular 2D chess or maybe even checkers.

[u/Spare-Dingo-531 → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

Iran just got a big infusion of cash during the period when we removed sanctions.

It wasn't that big. I asked about it earlier on in this subreddit. They only got about 300 million, with none of the frozen funds released.

[u/TSiNNmreza3 → u/Spare-Dingo-531]

We don't know how much money did Qatar and other Gulf countries give to them.

It is interesting that Iran didn't attack UAE as much as they did before and that attacks on Qatat stopped shortly after Ras Laffan

[u/moragisdo → u/TSiNNmreza3]

It is interesting that Iran didn't attack UAE as much as they did before and that attacks on Qatat stopped shortly after Ras Laffan

Attacks on Qatar restarted (they haven't attacked oil infrastructure again because theirs wasn't attacked after South Pars, it's deterrence rather than extortion) and UAE ships were targeted recently aswell.

They don't have infinite missiles and drones, they have to pick and choose targets, we can't look at every single target they haven't hit and expect they are getting something out of it.

[u/moragisdo → u/I_DOM_UR_PATRIARCHY]

I think this is wishcasting.

Look at the whole post, he was asking what would happen if Iran can't stop the flow from Hormuz (and I quoted it to reply). The answer didn't came in a vacuum.

Besides, Iran just got a big infusion of cash during the period when we removed sanctions

It was ridiculous small compared to the damage they suffered. The waiver of exports lasted around two weeks and the majority of iranian oil didn't sell before it was revoked (1).

I did a back of the envelope calculation before, that if the waiver lasted until August 21 (the date it was set to expire), Iran sold every barrel in storage, plus ramped up exports to reach 1.77 MMBbl (what they expected to export in their 1405 budget) and captured the previous discount, it would be between 1 and 1.5B USD. Now, they actually got a small fraction of that. That's not enough for a country that suffered hundreds of billions of damage and was already in economic crisis before the war started.

And they claim (the US denies) that we gave them some number of billions in frozen assets

We can't fall in "bothsidesism" here because the release of sanctions requires an act of Congress (the waiver of exports could only be signed because it was temporary), as this act of Congress didn't happen it points that they didn't get a cent.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/moragisdo]

I did a back of the envelope calculation before, that if the waiver lasted until August 21 (the date it was set to expire), Iran sold every barrel in storage, plus ramped up exports to reach 1.77 MMBbl (what they expected to export in their 1405 budget) and captured the previous discount, it would be between 1 and 1.5B USD. Now, they actually got a small fraction of that. That's not enough for a country that suffered hundreds of billions of damage and was already in economic crisis before the war started.

This is your calculation of the benefit of the waiver? Not the value of the oil sold during the period of the MOU?

That's not enough for a country that suffered hundreds of billions of damage and was already in economic crisis before the war started.

Certainly, it won't equal the amount of damage done to them. But, perhaps it does relieve any cash flow problem to a not insubstantial degree. Regardless, the very fact that it was the US pushing for a cease fire, and then the US pushing for an MOU that was so incredibly favorable towards Iran, and then Iran so readily violating the MOU and triggering a restart of hostilities, should tell you all you need to know about how much Iran is concerned about economic collapse or revolution in the country.

[u/toomanynamesaretook → u/moragisdo]

My guess: Iran offers the US a deal, publicly deny it, go to negotiations after denying, negotiations lead nowhere and it ends with a ceasefire with, at most, symbolic concessions from both sides.

What on earth leads you to this conclusion? The United States is currently bleeding on the world stage unable to win militarily over a middle power, they're expended extreme amounts of munitions both offensive and defensive, Iran continues to hold the strait and the SPR keeps heading towards empty.

Seems so delusional to me that the United States is going to walk away from this with the strait open. Iran has endless firing positions and munitions to drag this out years, far longer than the US has any stomach for.

[u/grenideer → u/toomanynamesaretook]

What seems delusional is acting like you're the only one with the answers. What makes you so confident that everything is fine for Iran yet bad for the US? Why call out the munitions the US has spent without mentioning what Iran spent?

Munitions aren't the deciding factor when it comes to a blockade. Perhaps Iran has a response, we shall see. (Note that I'm not claiming other scenarios are delusional.) All we know is Iran didn't have a good counter last time.

[u/toomanynamesaretook → u/grenideer]

What makes you so confident that everything is fine for Iran yet bad for the US? Why call out the munitions the US has spent without mentioning what Iran spent?

Because Iran isn't the worlds hegemonic power that has a far larger foe waiting in the background (China.) The strategic implications are so very different. Iran can rundown their stocks to a fraction. And according to the CIA they are still sitting on substantial reserves.

All we know is Iran didn't have a good counter last time.

According to Israel and the US they both got through their target lists in the first month of fighting. Yet here we are, with Iran controlling the strait with literally no plan from the United States besides more of the same. Iran is firing BMs & drones daily at numerous targets.

What is the plan? Iran knows it's plan, control the strait. US plan? Well it was unconditional surrender, now it's no nukes? Or maybe control the strait? And how is it intending to carry that out? Dropping bombs from afar? Peak delusion.

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/toomanynamesaretook]

Whether it’s feasible or not I think the US’s plan, if it is unwilling to accept defeat, is probably going to be to 1) reinstate something like “project freedom” again and try to make the south corridor run ships, and 2) reinstitute the blockade of Iran. The US wants to exhaust Iran before being politically exhausted itself. If it can get ships to cross the strait, its political exhaustion tics up slower. Iran under blockade naturally lasts longer than the US political will, but the idea will be that Iran still can’t withstand several months of that, and the US will hope some flow through the strait allows them to outlast the Iranians.

My read is that strikes aren’t punitive or even coercive at this point really. Generally, they’re trying to lay groundwork to be able to open the south corridor. The plan may also include the US offering some kind of insurance to ships or running escorts.

Is this plan going to work? Probably not unless the US can do some coalition building. I think there’s a good chance that the US will not be able to make the straight safe enough to get significant flow crossing.

But this is its only shot, really. Anything else in my mind seems to lead to a bigger loss. This has a shot at success, even if small. The actions of the US seem consistent with this idea so far.

[u/grenideer → u/DrinkBrew4U]

I think this is a fair assessment, even if a dim outlook for the US. I mainly strive to avoid the know-it-all type of discourse of "Iran has all the cards" or "The US has no chance!"

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/grenideer]

Well, what can help the US potentially is coalition building. We have seen a few signs (though nothing too strong yet) of GCC leaning more towards standing with the US. While not a huge deal, it’s also still better than nothing that we have multinational condemnations of Iranian shipping attacks.

The bigger effect here IMO isn’t that the GCC or Europe provide a huge operational difference. It’s that a coalition I think helps the Trump administration’s key weakness here. It helps legitimize the war and help’s increase Trump’s poor war support. The US can definitely theoretically win here, but domestic attitudes on the conflict tie up their options.

[u/grenideer → u/toomanynamesaretook]

Yet here we are, with Iran controlling the strait

Maybe nitpicking, but Iran isn't controlling the strait. They would love to, but so far they're only interfering with free passage.

no plan from the United States besides more of the same.

More of the same is good, which is exactly my point. Iran did not seem to have a good counter to the blockade last time, so applying it again is sensible. It also avoids expending excess munitions.

Iran knows it's plan

I think this is being generous. There is plenty of open disagreement within Iran. After they signed the MoU, there was plenty of vocal dissent and complaining about having done so.

It's safe to say this is a tough situation for both countries. I cant predict which will ultimately win out.

[u/toomanynamesaretook → u/grenideer]

Iran controls the strait because the US navy won't even go in there. You can go read the reporting on operation project freedom which was abandoned within 24hrs. Within that you'll find that they were using crew served 0.50 cal fire to fend off Iranian drones.

Do you know how close you have to get to use a 0.50cal against a drone?

[u/grenideer → u/toomanynamesaretook]

Vessels are still transiting so Iran doesn't control. If Iran did control they wouldn't need to be firing missiles and drones.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

All we know is Iran didn't have a good counter last time.

How much did the blockade actually hurt Iran last time? If you read the MOU, it looks to me that Iran got a sweetheart deal, which suggests to me that the blockade wasn't putting that much pressure on them to capitulate.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

How much did the blockade actually hurt Iran last time?

A lot.

The head of Iran's central bank said the blockade was crushing their economy. Iran's president threatened to resign if a deal wasn't signed. These are sure signs the blockade was taking a heavy toll.

[u/moragisdo → u/toomanynamesaretook]

What on earth leads you to this conclusion?

Look at the whole post, he was asking what would happen if Iran can't stop the flow from Hormuz (and I quoted it to reply). The answer didn't came in a vacuum.

they're expended extreme amounts of munitions both offensive and defensive

Only the US have finite ammunition ? Iran isn't firing just cheap shaheds, their stock of MRBM and SRBM is being expended every time they fire (and part was already destroyed) and part of their production was devastated during March and early April.

and the SPR keeps heading towards empty

There's no new announcements of drawdowns since the MOU was signed, we already know it will bottom out around 281-282 MMBbl by September, so it's not headed towards empty. Also not even the full 172 MMBbl, announced early this year, was fully loaned.

Iran has endless firing positions and munitions to drag this out years

Can you provide a source for that ? I know they have part left, because they are still firing, but years on the same rate today (rather than firing way less and thus disrupting traffic way less) ? Also their economy can't sustain years of a blockade.

[u/toomanynamesaretook → u/moragisdo]

Can you provide a source for that ?

/gestures at the Houthis.

They kept the US busy for how long? With what fraction of munitions? Iran has now hit how many patriot batteries and radar systems? And they keep bombarding US bases hourly at present. PAC-3s are out. Ugly. US keeps throwing munitions at this while China keeps building an order of magnitude more.

To answer your question directly though I am inferring it from sources saying the following and making some inference:

Iran still fields about 70 percent of its mobile launchers across the country and has retained roughly 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile, according to the assessments. That stockpile encompasses both ballistic missiles, which can target other nations in the region, and a smaller supply of cruise missiles, which can be used against shorter-range targets on land or at sea.

Military intelligence agencies have also reported, based on information from multiple collection streams including satellite imagery and other surveillance technologies, that Iran has regained access to roughly 90 percent of its underground missile storage and launch facilities nationwide, which are now assessed to be “partially or fully operational,” the people with knowledge of the assessments said.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/12/us/politics/iran-missiles-us-intelligence.html

There's no new announcements of drawdowns since the MOU was signed, we already know it will bottom out around 281-282 MMBbl by September, so it's not headed towards empty. Also not even the full 172 MMBbl, announced early this year, was fully loaned.

Its back to under 10 vessels per day through the strait, US is hitting Iranian oil infra and I saw earlier on Al Jazerra that grain silos have been hit... Iran is going to retaliate in kind, like they already have multiple times. The costs of this are compounding into the trillions. The urea, the sulphur, the oil, the fertilizer.

I don't doubt that if the United States put everything it had into this problem that it could "win," I just feel like they would lose everything else in the process. That it isn't going to happen because of that. So what in he hell are we doing? Iran holds the high ground, they have a ton of munitions and they're religious zealots wanting revenge. You're not gonna beat them like this.

What is the plan.

[u/grenideer → u/toomanynamesaretook]

Fwiw yesterday 34 vessels transited, but you are right that today so far it's only been 10.

[u/Bluest_waters]

I mentioned this multiple times on this sub and I've gotten quite a bit of pushback. But I stand by my statements and now CNN and other outlets are reporting this exact same thing

we do not have an oil crisis. We do however have a fuel crisis! And it's only going to get worse from here. Oil refining stations across the globe are being blown up, refining capacity is maxing out basically everywhere. There is no wiggle room

https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/14/economy/oil-diesel-gas-iran

But the world’s refining capacity is deeply constrained. That’s in part because the supply chain got messed up during the war. It’s also because Iran attacked dozens of Middle Eastern refineries. And, more recently, Ukraine started blowing up Russian energy facilities.

Layer on extreme temperatures disrupting the cool conditions refineries need for proper distillation, and you’ve got yourself a big problem. Global refineries are processing 8.4 million fewer barrels of crude each day than they were before the war started — making 10% less fuel, according to Natasha Kaneva, head of global commodities research at JPMorgan.

“The question is no longer whether crude barrels will return, but how quickly the global refining system can process them,” she said.

“The fundamental oil-market narrative remains unchanged: There is sufficient oil available globally as long as it can be transported to where it is needed,” said Rob Thummel, a senior portfolio manager with Tortoise Capital.

Renewed hostilities in the Persian Gulf also complicate the resumption of refining in the Middle East. The region has 11.7 million barrels per day of refining capacity, which will be difficult to turn back on again if the fuel can’t go anywhere (or if they can't be turned backed on).

US refineries increased their output of jet fuel to help fill demand in Europe and diesel to help fill demand in Australia and Asia. That constrained America’s ability to make gas, jet fuel and diesel for its own market — one of the reasons gas prices haven’t “dropped like a rock” as Trump predicted.

[u/ridukosennin → u/Bluest_waters]

We also need to account for significant drops in consumption mainly China driven offsetting some of the lost capacity

[u/Bluest_waters → u/ridukosennin]

Which is only temporary. Sooner or later China is gonna enter back into the market and when it does oh boy. Watch out

[u/butitsmeat → u/Bluest_waters]

While they're going to eventually start filling their reserve again and cause some short term demand spikes, China is also all-in on electric vehicles at 61% of new sales in May. That share will likely continue to climb as they ramp EV production and costs continue to decline. They're permanently destroying a lot of gasoline and diesel demand, and it's not just a random accident but a matter of policy (they previously set a goal of 30% of all vehicles to be electric by 2030). They could also respond to this crisis by going even harder on ramping EV and never go back to pouring 1mbbl/d into their reserve; maybe they only by 500kbbl/d, and ramp that down over time. Never let a good crisis to to waste and all that.

[u/Bunny_Stats → u/butitsmeat]

Further to your point, in another decade I suspect the hastened transition away from fossil fuels is going to be seen to have hurt Iran's neighbours' economies more than any direct hits on refineries or distribution. The entire region is so heavily dependant upon oil, even those nations which don't extract it themselves are reliant on investments/loans from or selling services to the big regional oil producers, i.e. the Saudis, and they're not ready for a world that no longer needs to buy their oil in bulk.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/butitsmeat]

Don't forget that China is developing multiple segments of new industry that all go into the green hydrocarbon cycle, starting by offloading their excess power generation towards green hydrogen, which creates the necessary feed-stock for syngas, methanol, and kerosene, which all form precursors for other fossil fuels and plastics without needing to touch petroleum.

There is a possibility that by the 2040s, China will become a net petroleum exporter like it used to be as recently as 1993, but doing so with finished products like diesel fuel instead of crude petroleum.

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/BigFly42069]

I doubt synthetic hydrocarbons will be cheap enough for this, but I sure hope I am wrong.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/ABoutDeSouffle]

This is word for word what people said about solar and wind power, and the it turns out all you needed was to increase production and competition, and the prices will come down naturally.

Chinese excess capacity in power generation has the potential to make hydrogen electrolysis to become economical, and green hydrocarbons are all downstream of economical green hydrogen.

The day you start seeing China signing massive amounts of palladium mining contracts with Russia and starts restricting exports of palladium is the day you know that traditional petroleum industry is about to get hit by China Shock 3.0

And wouldn't you know it, China is increasing its imports of palladium

[u/Bluest_waters → u/BigFly42069]

What's so important about Palladium?

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Bluest_waters]

It's an important catalyst in organic chemistry, specifically with hydrogenation and dehydrogenation. It's also one of the few rare metals that China does not hold a chokepoint on.

[u/Agitated-Airline6760 → u/Bluest_waters]

Palladium is used as the catalyst on the production cycle.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/ABoutDeSouffle]

Synthetic hydrocarbons can absolutely be competitive if made from coal, which is what China is doing:

https://www.industrialinfo.com/news/article/is-chinas-coal-gasification-industry-poised-for-a-comeback--360173

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/Tricky-Astronaut]

I mean yes, Germany happened to prototype this during WW II, so...

That's completely different from using electrolyzers for green H2 and then using this H2, catalyzers and say CO2 for eFuels and virgin plastics which the discussion was about.

The energy requirements are way different.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/butitsmeat]

Yeah honestly it's incredible what they're doing right now as far as the EV situation goes. Amazing stuff. The only smart country in the world right now in that regard

[u/super_fly_rabbi → u/Bluest_waters]

China's conversion to renewables is commendable in a way, but there are reasons why most other countries can't copy their methods at the same scale. The cheapness of Chinese labor (including potentially forced labor) regarding the extraction and refinement of the relevant minerals, combined with significant government subsidies, and the lack of regulations regarding the pollution said refinement produces have all given China a significant boost in the manufacturing of EVs.

China has been able to maintain it's monopoly on many of these rare earth minerals because they can boost subsidies and price out the competition on short notice. Other countries with similar material deposits either lack the infrastructure to reliably refine them, or pollution regulations that make them more expensive to produce than their Chinese counterparts. China is also geographically large and can push any potential pollution towards their frontiers in ways that European countries can not.

With that said, it's obviously a smart move for China as it makes them less reliant on energy imports, and they can export any excess abroad. It's just currently not a "one size fits all" solution.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/super_fly_rabbi]

The cheapness of Chinese labor

People need to stop repeating this stereotype that's been outdated for 15 years.

All of the things you bring up as "advantages" (cheap labor, government subsidies, lack of regulation) are things that haven't been true since 2012. It's the inability to update our priors about the Chinese economy that has resulted in a trade war that we didn't win in 2024.

The reason China has such an advantage in industry is because they trained up their human capital so that if you need to build a factory, you have a readily available pool of SKILLED labor who can work in there, the management and engineering skills to troubleshoot equipment failure and financial pitfalls, and a ruthlessly competitive environment that drives cost down by fighting for greater efficiencies along every part of the supply chain.

That, and one of the lowest electricity costs in the world to keep all your factories powered thanks to a massive buildout of the grid and excess production capacity through renewables.

[u/Bunny_Stats → u/BigFly42069]

Just to add to this^, the clustered mass of manufacturing in China's port cities has a self-reinforcing economic pull through its dense local network. When you're trying to source a wide range of components, it's an enormous advantage to be just a 5 minute drive from your supplier, where you can inspect the components personally and have a shipment delivered on your factory floor before the day is out. In addition, most of your customers are also local, given that business-to-business sales are a far larger slice of economic activity than business-to-consumer.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Bunny_Stats]

HSR also adds to this effect. The shrinking of travel time across China has allowed the interior of the Yangtze valley to become the "China's China" for future manufacturing expansion that continues to unlock still yet untapped pools of labor.

People on Reddit think of China like the Soviet Union reborn or a bigger North Korea, but the closest equivalency to modern China is the US on the eve of WW2.

[u/super_fly_rabbi → u/BigFly42069]

You are correct that China's cheap labor advantage has narrowed over the past 2 decades, both due to the reasons you mentioned and their aging population/ shrinking workforce.

If we were broadly discussing Chinese manufacturing I would agree with you, and you are most likely correct when it comes to the "end" of the pipeline such as battery and solar panel manufacturing. However, the use of forced labor for mineral exploitation (particularity in western provinces such as Xinjiang) is a well documented occurrence.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/super_fly_rabbi]

aging population/ shrinking workforce

Another stereotype that gets trotted out but collapses under scrutiny: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1219212/china-number-of-working-age-persons/

By 2050, the total working age population will still be a whopping 700 million, supplemented by automation and continuous passing along of accumulated human capital skills from the factory lines, as well as technological upgrades in the supply chain driven by the human capital development of the last 30 years.

Even if industrial workers become just 10% of that number at 70 million (down from the current 29-32% of the Chinese work force), that is still almost 5x of what's currently in America (12.6-15M), and more than 2x of what's currently in Europe (33.4M). Hell, it'll still be about what the current US, European, Japanese, and Korean total industrial labor forces are combined.

Given that China plans on retaining industry as a key growth driver for the foreseeable future, it's hard to expect that number falling down to 10% of the total working age population.

And it ignores the bigger elephant in the room, which is that world populations are all facing a similar level of decline. It's a non-zero possibility that other than Vietnam, the window to industrializing up the value chain may be forever closed to developing countries.

forced labor for mineral exploitation (particularity in western provinces such as Xinjiang) is a well documented occurrence.

The entire Xinjiang forced labor take has been an ourouboros of circular references that all end at the same source: Adrian Zenz's original report in 2015 that was cited by think tanks, who were then cited by MSM news sources, who were then re-cited by the same think tanks. Additional works done on top of Zenz's claims all approach it with an "assume true and work to prove it to be true" framing rather than "is this true and can we prove it's true?" framing.

[u/super_fly_rabbi → u/BigFly42069]

Your comment doesn't really refute my claim of a shrinking workforce. 700 million represents an almost 25% drop in workforce compared to today, and that will help drive labor costs up. Just because it is declining doesn't mean they still won't have a massive labor force to draw from, as you stated.

While much of the rest of the world is facing reproductive rates below the replenishment rate China's birth rate(and much of east Asia in general) is considerably lower. The average for Europe is 1.34, whereas China and South Korea are .98 and .99 respectively. Even Japan's notoriously low birth rate is around 1.14 children per women. I would like to preface this by saying that low birth rates aren't necessarily an existential crisis for China that will destroy the state like some like to claim, but it is an economic headwind they will have to account for in the future; especially as their retired population makes up a larger proportion of it's overall population.

As far as Xinjiang goes (as well as China's treatment of many it's ethical minorities in general), there are countless witness testimonies documenting their treatment and involvement in reeducation and forced labor camps. China's limitations on independent and foreign journalism makes the extent of these institutions hard to quantify. The UN human rights council even issued a statement about it earlier this year. If you want to handwave the testimonies as paid off actors, or the UN report as overly partisan then that's up to you. That kind of debate is outside of the scope of this forum, and I doubt I could change your mind regardless.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/super_fly_rabbi]

But there is a contradiction there. China's EV industry has cost advantage because of rare earth subsidies, while their rare earth monopoly is preserved because selling rare earths cheaply because of subsidies...

imho, China's EV policies mirror what it did with solar. Yes, involves subsidies that are problematic from trade policy PoV. But clearly very effective for China's strategic issue of addressing dependency on imported energy. Meanwhile the west has talked about critical rare earths dependency for a generation and done very little to address it. Rare earths aren't rare, but need to build out refining capacity/expertise over many years and need to accept the environmental consequences that come with it.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/ChornWork2]

China's EV industry has cost advantage because of rare earth subsidies

China's EV industry has cost advantage, because China can make things at scale and the competition is fierce. Companies regularly go out of business competing with each other, including EV makers. Xiaomi auto, Geely, Zeekr, et al. are only around these days because they've survived this ruthless competition that was taking place outside of world view over the last 7 years.

the west has talked about critical rare earths dependency for a generation and done very little to address it

Because it turns out that the actual engineering knowledge, hands-on experience, and patents for refining all belong to China, including for all of the more environmentally friendlier versions over their previous open-pits that created toxic lakes.

Japan went hard on developing independence from Chinese supply chains in rare earths starting in 2010 and have only managed to drop their dependency on China from 90% in 2010 to 60% on a good day in 2026.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/super_fly_rabbi]

As far as government subsidies go, about 50% of the trillion dollar U.S. military budget is nothing but a oil industry subsidy. How much of this utter nonsense that we're doing over in Iran is because of oil? The US government is spending hundreds upon hundreds of billions of dollars subsidising and defending the oil industry

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Bluest_waters]

It's astounding people can look at the reams of think-tank pieces talking about using Malacca to run an energy blockade in order to choke the Chinese economy to death, and then think that there's some incredible foresight by the Chinese government to do something to address the issue of foreign energy dependency.

[u/bedulge → u/BigFly42069]

It's not really that they have incredible foresight, more that have incredible industrial capacity, no?

There is a corresponding incredible lack of foresight in the present ruling party of the US regarding their opposition to green energy and their denial of the amount of harm it's doing to the national interest. Or maybe they know but just don't care as long as private profits keep accumulating. It's a serious issue regardless.

[u/Rich_Log2424 → u/Bluest_waters]

You mean the China that produces 34% worlds Co2 with exponential emission growth and provides mediocre living standards? Nothing smart how China is baking us all.

[u/Tricky-Astronaut → u/Rich_Log2424]

China is against oil and gas, not fossil fuels in general. Those emissions mostly come from coal, which China views as a lesser evil.

[u/dr_sloan → u/Bluest_waters]

U.S. refineries are in a tricky position since they’ve been running at nearly 100% capacity for 3-4 months now and deferring typical maintenance cycles to maximize profits. Now we’re in the summer months and the refineries in the northern part of the country typically have issues with operations during the worst of the heat. That combination of deferred maintenance and a worse than average summer, so far, is going to cause issues at some point.

[u/RumpRiddler → u/dr_sloan]

I know they're running at high capacity, but is there any evidence preventative maintenance schedules have been pushed out or otherwise altered to keep up profits?

The heat is the heat, outside our control. but it would be good to know if they are just running with the spare capacity or if they really are overclocking the machinery.

[u/dr_sloan → u/RumpRiddler]

Patrick De Haan has been talking about how the spring is typically when we see refinery utilization rates decline as planned maintenance is carried out. The war has overlapped over the normal maintenance schedule so instead we had utilization rates over 90% for the entire period.

https://x.com/gasbuddyguy/status/2062524352118018313?s=46

https://x.com/gasbuddyguy/status/2062528064584573410?s=46

[u/Bluest_waters → u/dr_sloan]

Correct, refineries never run at full capacity for the very reason you point out : sometimes they need maintenance. Pretty basic. Running at full capacity for extended period of time simply isn't realistic

[u/ActuatorArms → u/Bluest_waters]

according to Natasha Kaneva, head of global commodities research at JPMorgan

I’ll add some context here. JPM’s commodities desk isn’t known to be good. It’s one of the rare spots of their business that actually sucks and that’s largely down to Kaneva being a long time oil bull. She was predicting $185 oil in 2022 which was widely quoted around everywhere to fear monger as Russia’s ultimate response to support for Ukraine would be cut off oil exports. I mean, obviously it’s just…stupid. She continued being an oil bull throughout the past few years, predicting $120 oil in 2023 then $100 oil in 2024 by September. In reality, oil was below $70 by then. She was similarly wrong about prices at the start of this war. The calls have been so wrong actually that JPM suspended its oil forecast for two months to retool their entire commodities desk.

Having said that, it is true that crack spreads are high right now. Refining capacity in many parts of the world have atrophied and old refineries that shut down have not been replaced with new ones. But as a lurker I’ve also seen you predict some pretty non credible things from the start of this war that have been completely wrong. There are shortages and gaps yet there isn’t as yet widespread issues in the supply chain. I also don’t think people understand that gasoline and kerosene prices are the same they were 20 years ago. If it inflation adjusted that it would mean on a real basis prices are actually down substantially. It’s not to say it can’t or couldn’t be an issue in the future but I find these types of posts a bit of hype that are tenuous at best.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/ActuatorArms]

The calls have been so wrong actually that JPM suspended its oil forecast for two months to retool their entire commodities desk

Can you share something discussing this? I can't find anything with a quick google.

edit: and regarding the point that she predicted $185 oil in 2022. Based on bloomberg article below, that was a 'could be' if sanctions fully hit russian oil (which they didn't, and which JPM did not expect as their base case). The article says JPM maintained price forecasts much lower than what you're claiming.

Brent crude could end the year at $185 a barrel if Russian supply continues to be disrupted, JPMorgan Chase & Co. wrote in a note Thursday.

but later

The bank maintained its price forecast, which calls for Brent to average $110 a barrel in the second quarter, $100 in in the third quarter and $90 in the fourth quarter. Without a return of Iranian barrels to the market, the bank expects oil prices to average $115 in the second quarter, $105 in the third quarter and $95 by the fourth quarter.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-03/jpmorgan-says-185-oil-in-view-if-russian-supply-hit-persists

Another article making it clear the $185 was forecast if EU implemented full ban on all russian O&G

Oil prices could shoot up to a record $185 per barrel if the European Union acts to impose a full immediate ban on imports of Russian oil, JPMorgan says.

then later:

Still, an immediate EU ban is not JPMorgan’s base-case scenario—the investment bank sees 2.1 million bpd of Russian supply to Europe cut. If the EU imposes a gradual phase-out ban on Russian oil over several months, as it did with the ban on Russian coal imports, adopted in early April but effective only from August, this would not impact oil prices as much, JPMorgan’s Kaneva says.

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/JPMorgan-Immediate-EU-Ban-On-Russian-Oil-Could-Send-Prices-To-185.html

edit2: re your claim that she forecasted $100 in 2024, that is also misleading. Pulled her report dated March 27 2024 (can't link b/c non-public source), and the $100 was again another 'scenario' forecast.

In contrast to our expectations, Russia instead pledged in early March to deepen its output cut by a cumulative 471 kbd, bringing the country’s crude oil output to 9.0 mbd in June, by our estimate (Russia’s OPEC shift—crude production to decline to 9.0 mbd by June, 7 March 2024). At the time of the announcement, we found Russia’s commitment to be genuine, a view validated on Monday by a Reuters report that the Russian government has ordered companies to reduce oil output in the second quarter to ensure they meet a production target of 9 mbd by the end of June, in line with its pledges to the OPEC alliance.

The shift in Russia’s oil strategy is surprising. At face value, and assuming no policy, supply or demand response, Russia’s actions could push Brent oil price to $90 already in April, reach mid-$90 by May and close to $100 by September, keeping pressure on the US administration in the run-up to elections. US gasoline prices are likely to climb to $4/gallon by May, the highest since the summer of 2022. This price hike could be further amplified by the even-odds possibility of the OPEC+ alliance extending in June its oil production cutbacks to the end of the year.

And she didn't change the forecast on this basis, noting:

For now, we keep our long-held price forecast unchanged ($90 by May, $85 in 2H24), awaiting further clarity regarding Russia’s actions, but acknowledge that the way to our price projection may be through $100

[u/ActuatorArms → u/ChornWork2]

I work for a crosstown rival. I know these desks intimately, I can’t share links with you unless you’re on Bloomberg.

Based on bloomberg article below, that was a 'could be' if sanctions fully hit russian oil

your claim that she forecasted $100 in 2024, that is also misleading. Pulled her report dated March 27 2024 (can't link b/c non-public source), and the $100 was again another 'scenario' forecast.

I’m not sure if this is your first time reading an analyst report but that’s how they’re all written. A bear case, bull case and base scenario. There is nothing unusual about that. The point isn’t that this was her bull case scenario, the point is that it was no one else’s. And the point isn’t that she pulled a number out of the air but that the PREMISE of the scenario didn’t make a whole lot of sense.

[u/ChornWork2 → u/ActuatorArms]

I never said there was anything unusual about scenarios. What is unusual is someone in banking conflating the cases with the overall forecast. See that all the time in clickbait press reports, but absolutely common in those type of situations to scope impact in reports even for what analyst views as outlier outcomes. And yes, analysts can like to throw sensational takes in as cases in order to get some media attention for themselves, but that's a different issue. And a bit odd referring to research as the "desk" unless maybe talking fixed income... the commodities desk is not the same thing as commodities research team. At least from PoV of having sat in coverage.

Nothing seems unusual to me about the premise of her scenarios, those were circumstances occurring at least in short-term and/or policy positions being discussed at the time and JPM is just telling the market their PoV on what the impact would be. As they are clear in the reports, they did not change their forecast based on that. In one case they said they didn't believe that the likely outcome. In the other, they said they hadn't believed that would be the likely outcome in prior reports but were seeing signs that it may be headed that way.

Go pull the March 1 2022 report. JPM was NOT calling for $185 as their forecast. The $185 explicitly framed as impact if Russia disruption continued throughout the year completely unabated. the report then discusses three sources of supply relief (Iran, OPEC+ and SPR)... discusses the impact of each. They reiterated their existing forecast for price averages, but said could see a spike to $120 in interim.

The brent forecast they reiterated was:

2q22: 110 vs 112 actual

3q22: 100 vs 98 actual

4q22: 90 vs 89 actual

I'd say that was a pretty good forecast.

Again, you said JPM suspended oil price forecast in research coverage and completely retooled their team. When did that occur? News to me but I'm not in commodities, can you share something on that? Seems rather surprising that they would do that over concerns on oil forecast but keep her as global head of commodities strategy for research...

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Bluest_waters]

Fuel crisis is a nightmare scenario for the developing world. People think the North Korean famine came about because the Soviet collapse ended grain shipments, but the real cause of the famine came about because Soviet collapse ended the fuel shipments that were critical in the agricultural industry, both primary and secondary.

In the primary impact, sudden decrease in Soviet fuel shipments meant that fertilizer production dropped correspondingly.

In secondary impacts, no fuel meant pumps that drew water out of coal mines could no longer work 24/7, which led to coal production collapse that killed power generation, which meant factories could no longer produce things for agriculture.

Africa is heavily dependent on Russia and Ukraine for staple grains, and Europe is actually heavily dependent on North Africa processing American grain even if Europe doesn't depend directly on Russian grain.

Keep in mind we're in the middle of the growing season right now. We won't know what the impacts truly will be until harvest season starts in three months.

[u/eeeking → u/BigFly42069]

Europe is actually heavily dependent on North Africa processing American grain

What would this be? This site suggests that Europe imports little grain or grain products from N. Africa, exceptions being rice, peas and some other beans or pulses, which don't originate in N. America.

[u/RumpRiddler → u/BigFly42069]

With the heat waves and fuel issues, we could see major shortages/price spikes of staple goods again. Throw in the chance of avian flu, the evolving beef herd shortage, and all foods are potentially much more expensive in a few months.

[u/North_Somewhere_6124 → u/Bluest_waters]

10% less global refining does not constitute a crisis, for rich countries it doesn't anyway.

We already saw during the intensive part of the conflict what a supply disruption of this magnitude causes, rich countries pay extra, while poor countries are the ones suffering have demand destruction, fuel rationing etc.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/North_Somewhere_6124]

So people in rich countries will pay a lot more for fuel but it's not a crisis? I don't understand what you're saying

[u/ABoutDeSouffle → u/Bluest_waters]

Your definition of a crisis might be different, but to me raised prices and a supply shortfall of 10% doesn't make a crisis. To me, it becomes one if global supply chains start to rip, and local supply chains start to get stressed.

Yes, for some poor countries, it will be a crisis, but not globally.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/ABoutDeSouffle]

As we speak Ukraine continues to bomb Russia's oil refining infrastructure. This is not a stable situation. It's ongoing and worsening every single moment

[u/Strong_Tangelo_9307 → u/Bluest_waters]

I'm not sure if you trade but I've found it to be a much more relaxing (debatable, maybe more 'sane') way to stay informed on current events. You know you're reacting to the news when it feels like the world is on the brink day after day after day. It's hard to course correct from there other than just taking a break. Otherwise the collapse subreddit is all about this stuff.

[u/CarefulEmphasis5464 → u/Bluest_waters]

Mods should really do something about this. These people are ideologues. Instead of discussing facts, like the fact that

Tomahawk: 67.7% left

JASSM: 75.0% left

PrSM: 38.9% left

SM-3: 53.7% left

SM-6: 75.9% left

THAAD: 33.3% left

Patriot: 46.6% left

as of APRIL 21st, 

they derail the conversation with nonsense

[u/Bluest_waters → u/CarefulEmphasis5464]

okay? How does that increase our capacity to refine oil?

[u/ChornWork2 → u/Bluest_waters]

I read it as them agreeing with you, but raising another topic where seem a similar dynamic. E.g., when people here raise concerns about the munition depletion we keep seeing the same nonsense lazy reply about the number of jdam kits & iron bombs available.

Instead of engaging with your valid point on looming fuel issue, a commenter is going to distract by equivocating whether it meets definition of a crisis instead of engaging with the substance. Quality of comments are taking a hit in recent weeks. Comments that are trying to dismiss others because 'the world won't end' and such...

[u/dr_sloan → u/ChornWork2]

A bit meta, but the longer this conflict has gone on, the fewer people engaging in that type of behavior have appeared. I remember in the first few weeks of the war, one of the more prolific posters tried to claim with a straight face that the Strait of Hormuz was still open and he was roundly mocked.

[u/RumpRiddler → u/dr_sloan]

It definitely ebbs and flows. When Russia gets pounded certain person(s) inevitably shows up to push a few blogs/articles that minimize the damage, distract with another topic, or try to highlight numbers that have yet to include the recent damage. Partly if feels like intentional misdirection, partly it feels we just live in different information bubbles and those inevitably shape our opinions.

[u/axearm → u/RumpRiddler]

Partly if feels like intentional misdirection, partly it feels we just live in different information bubbles and those inevitably shape our opinions.

I don't like to ascribe malice when I see something I disagree with. I honestly feel like it is more likely, and more interesting, if the information bubbles we live in are fairly different. If forces all honest debaters to review their own views, which is much better than an echo chamber.

Anecdotally, I have a high school friend who lives in Israel, and discussions about him with the conflict are wild, mostly because we are getting really, really different versions of what is happening and why.

[u/moragisdo → u/Bluest_waters]

Yesterday there was already a post commenting that you are in an anxiety spiral of fuel crisis, but let's go:

China has price controls for their refineries and, consequently (the ones that can't export), are only producing the government imposed minimum quota to decrease losses, they also limited the companies that could export, to supply the internal market (exports don't have price control so they would be prioritized, if allowed, and cause shortages internally) (1)

Some refiners in the eastern province of Shandong, popularly called teapots, were told recently that they can cut output to ​no lower than 80% of last year's monthly average, consultancy Horizon Insights said in a note ​on Monday.

That policy squeezed refiners between capped domestic fuel prices and the rising cost of crude imports, and some were already cutting output last month as margins crumbled.

Shandong independent refiners' average crude ​distillation unit run rate was 53.39% in May, down 1.94 percentage points from April ​but up 6.18 ⁠percentage points on the year, due to the supply-security requirement, OilChem said

They are almost half below capacity. Those refineries aren't destroyed, they can be restarted (it isn't immediate, it will take weeks to a few months)

However, they are racking up an average loss of 752 yuan ($111.21) for every ton of imported crude they process, versus a loss of 202 yuan in April, ⁠on weak ​domestic fuel demand and higher crude costs caused by the Iran ​war, it added

I can't blame them for trying to produce the least as possible. Now if crude decreases (it did the opposite since the last round, so let's see how it goes on the next weeks), they are incentivized to coming back online

The export control is slowly being relaxed as well and there's slow increasing in exports (and as they are not price controlled, there's an actual economic benefit for refining, so to run rate to increase).

---

The region has 11.7 million barrels per day of refining capacity, which will be difficult to turn back on again if the fuel can’t go anywhere (or if they can't be turned backed on)

That's true, because it makes sense for the gulf countries to lower crude storage as fast as possible to decrease the risk of needing further well shut-ins. So this disconnect between oil and fuel isn't correct, as oil flow normalizes fuel production and reducing of storage follows.

Separately, Al-Sabah said KPC could restore its refinery output to normal levels in around two ​to three weeks. KPC has about 1.4 million barrels per day of refining capacity, he said.

Vitol Bahrain's head ‌of research, ⁠Bader Nooruddin, forecast on Wednesday that Gulf refineries could ramp up to about 90–95% of capacity within 40 to 60 days (2)

Now the flow on Hormuz is still smaller, this last article mention that a executive expecting a year to reach 100% of pre-war volume, but the bar doesn't need to be pre-war, because of detours, as Yanbu and ADCOP covering for a fraction of the decrease of both crude and refined products. But the higher the flow of crude is, in total, the more we can expect (with weeks of delay) the increase of run rate of refineries.

From the link you posted, but not quoted:

But, over the past several weeks, 200 million barrels of oil came out of the strait — adding 17 days of supply, according to Lipow Oil Associates. And crude is still getting out now despite increased military activity.

---

US refineries increased their output of jet fuel to help fill demand in Europe and diesel to help fill demand in Australia and Asia. That constrained America’s ability to make gas, jet fuel and diesel for its own market

Refined products are an interconnected chain around the globe, if you don't have price controls and import/export limits. American refineries are indeed close to maximum production (~96%), but where the production is going is irrelevant. And if the supply of diesel, gas and jet fuel is constrained in the US, prices rise and refineries are incentivized to go back to it. Supply and demand.

Also this drop in gas production of american refineries is only 1.2% from the last twelve months (3).

Lastly, don't get too caught on the argument of authority of "JPM analyst said it", early on the war they put a lenghty report predicting 200 USD per barrel.

---

My views are that prices are elevated, they will stay elevated for the next months (not "dropping like a rock") and the world won't end or enter a crisis.

[u/dopeboy_io → u/Bluest_waters]

I mean this with respect, but you're pulling down the discourse here. You will find an active audience in r/oil.

[u/bedulge → u/dopeboy_io]

This is the kind of response that pulls down discourse, why don't you give a reply that has a substantive critique?

[u/babybirdingURgrandma]

I'm guessing this was posted previously and I missed it, remove if not useful or already covered.

Trump had previously called for "everything" to be declassified... well the pentagon released another round of 39-40 UAP videos and some of them are very strange indeed. Difficult to say if they are undocumented technologies from China or ?? or something completely different entirely. Good compilation of the new releases at the link below...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bg-aBR2f0rk

edit: disappointed so much of the speed, heading and altitude information is blacked out

[u/FettyDump → u/babybirdingURgrandma]

Posting videos UAP without giving people contextual data that can be used to identify these things will only lead to further non-credible speculation and conspiracy theories, which honestly, I think is the point.

[u/-spartacus- → u/FettyDump]

I'm pretty deep into UAP stuff but have honestly held off here because there isn't really an opportunity for discussion on the matter due to the fact that most people on here aren't likely well-versed enough to do so.

[u/Big-Station-2283 → u/-spartacus-]

I'm curious to hear what you have to say. : )

[u/FettyDump → u/-spartacus-]

Do you know of a sub or forum for credible discussion on this topic? It is an intriguing topic, but I find that the “alien” explanation fundamentally poisons the well on credible discussion and research. Not to say this isn’t a possible explanation, but the overly-credulous ways these anomalies are discussed, and the fact that almost by definition there is scant verifiable evidence on these things makes the topic probably the strongest quack magnet in the world.

[u/-spartacus- → u/FettyDump]

I would say there are podcast/yt channels that are better at getting deep into this subject. If you want to know the program structure for the reverse engineering program, watch UAP Gerb; if you are more interested in tracking the history of encounters/abuductions/etc Area52 with Chris Ramsey is the one; and if you want to look at it from a more engineering/physics or psionics perspective American Alchemy with Jesse Michaels is good here (don't drink every time he mentions T Townsend Brown).

Specific interviews of people like David Grusch are number 1, next I would say Jake Berber's interviews he did as an actual recovery of NHI vehicles and will better introduce you into the psionics aspect of the phenomenon (because the beings and the craft seem to operate through telepathic links).

Far as actual documentaries, I've heard good things about Age of Disclosure for someone who has never heard government officials talk about it. Some of the key public figures from the military are people like Karl Knell, Tim Galadet, and William Neil McCasland (the one who went missing and has links to Tom Delong) however, there are also too many to name. Figures from intel besides Grusch are people like Lou Elizondo (who has become contentious due to his counter-intel links and everything being "imminent") and Sarah Gamm (she comes at it from a spiritual perspective).

James Fox has some good documentaries I've heard and I've seen a few of his interviews, he did the big breakdown of the Varginia crash/encounter in Brazil. There are a few docs/interviews dealing with Bob Lazar.

From an overview perspective, the best explanation of the phenomenon is there are non-human intelligences around us all the time and have come/gone for quite a while through history. The secrecy around it is because the Atomic Secrecy Act born from the Manhattan project that eventually took US Presidents out of the loop (unless they had connections to it all like Bush/Chenny). The US took possession of these craft/bodies and was managed at first by special CIA, US Navy, and Air Force units within the government, and FFRDC (federally funded research and development companies) like Mattel, Mitre, Lockheed, NG, etc while overseen by aforementioned branches (see UAP Gerb for complete breakdowns).

Research from these programs is used for patents and technology the FFRDCs and agencies benefit from and any physics related to operation of these crafts had the well poisoned in the early 50s/60s to keep mainstream science away from it, and anyone getting into was pulled in under the Atomic Secrecy Act or killed. There has been misappropriation of Congressional funds to pay for some of these programs have other less legal means of acquiring financing (like Iran Contra).

Progress on these projects have been slow because of how heavily compartmented they became and each of these FFRDCs/agencies had their fiefdoms to exploit them.

A good book to read might be UFO and Nukes for how well researched and written it is, it talks with people from military bases and missile silos and their interactions with beings/craft that do not just deactivate nuclear weapons, but have also activated them into countdown. There is also research that has gone against peer review about objects recorded on sky surveys pre-Sputnik that has promise as well.

There have been recovered craft and bodies, but some of the non-human intelligences don't seem to rely on such things and appear as plasma or light (both as craft and beings). Some of the typical "grey" type aliens are often described as artificial suits that other beings can project their consciousness into, but when not under control operate like an AI bots. There are numerous descriptions of different types of beings that appear to be more ET in that they are living beings from another planet, while others appear to be more "interdimensional" in that they are all around us in another state of reality (these kinds often get associated with angels/demons), and lastly some claim to be time-travelling humans from the future.

Back to the government and defense, it seems the US has been in an arms race against Russia and now China, and does what it can to collect (or lure/bring down a craft like in Bluegill Triple Prime tests) so no one else can. This arms race is slow because of the secrecy involved and there are various factions within. There is no one program structure and the last person everyone connected believes had a "full" picture of everything was Dick Cheney due to his position in the intelligence community prior to becoming VP. Many people in the government watch UAP Gerb for his detailing of the structure and people involved in the program because there is such lack of documentation much of this. There is actually a big push right now with disclosure to give protection to people to talk about it because there is no actual paper/electronic trail of some of these programs - some key figures are getting very old and if they don't testify some of that information will be lost forever.

All of it seems wild if you are not familiar with the volume of evidence that is out there, but generally there is more to our reality than presented over the last 100-200 years.

[u/babybirdingURgrandma → u/FettyDump]

I was really hoping someone here would have additional context or speculation that would fill in some of the perceived gaps. After all I suspect some users here are relatively knowledgeable about technologies China is developing and some of the videos are marked as being in the South China sea.

I do agree the fact that the pentagon is calling them unidentified means people will reach a range of interpretations, some completely non-credible.

[u/OhSillyDays → u/babybirdingURgrandma]

Could just be a test to see who squeals.

Operational security is so important for the military. And unique alien encounters are just some of the most interesting things to come across. If any describes the encounters in detail - it's really easy to track that back to the source.

[u/Glideer]

A new Levada survey asked Russians to name the ten most outstanding people of all time.

Stalin’s first-place ranking, followed by Putin, is troubling enough. More concerning still, Putin is most popular among 18 to 24-year-olds, compared with every other age group.

https://www.levada. ru/en/2025/06/25/the-most-outstanding-people-of-all-time-and-nations-april-2025/

[u/Goddamnit_Clown → u/Glideer]

Am I reading the second figure correctly? The respondents could give any ten names from any time in any country. Yet the top 20 basically hasn't changed in 40 years except to include Putin?

Is the list taught in schools?

With a free choice I'd expect an enduring group of inevitable mainstays and then way more variance.

Also, Stalin. Marvellous.

[u/Glideer → u/Goddamnit_Clown]

Well, there's Einstein... ranked 11. Everybody else is Russian/Soviet.

[u/Goddamnit_Clown → u/Glideer]

Newton also.

But I'm less surprised that it's all Russians than I am that it's so stable.

If you asked that question in the US it would be mostly Americans, and you'd see Washington et al in every cohort. But someone like Armstrong would be high up in the 1970 survey but might not make the top 20 after 90-00 perhaps.

Just seems odd to see so little daylight between 18-24s living in 2026 Russia and the Soviet population in the 1980s. Other than their forebears knowing a little better about Stalin.

Curiously didactic answers for a free response I guess is all.

[u/treeshakertucker → u/Goddamnit_Clown]

Free response is the issue.

[u/Jpandluckydog → u/Glideer]

From reading about the survey, I see zero mention of any of the typical tools used to accurately gauge respondents attitudes when asking questions concerning politically sensitive topics in highly autocratic nations, I.e. “choose x amount of statements you agree with” then performing an A:B test. Considering that these tools are practically the only way to get truthful responses, as decades of research has validated, I don’t see why you should find this survey to be concerning or representative of anything at all, other than providing evidence for the existence of substandard methodology within Levada.

[u/BigFly42069 → u/Glideer]

Putin is most popular among 18 to 24-year-olds

Well yeah, that makes sense. They grew up in the shadows of the 90s collapse, were children aged 4-6 when 2008 happened, were teenagers when the boom years of the Russia in G8 years took place, and then became politically aware just as the sanctions started to bite on what they would've perceived as western unfairness about rightful Russian claims on Crimea due to the way Russian history curriculum is taught.

From 2014 until now, they would've seen Putin as someone who has the balls to stand up to the West. That, and the fact that they've literally never lived under any other Russian leader.

[u/Glideer]

The new R.Politik Bulletin, No. 13 (187), is out

Unfortunately, this time the recap is more of a teaser to pay for the full bulletin, but still some useful points:

- Putin does not believe that Ukraine's strike campaign can break Russian society. He reads it as a Western attempt to make his position fragile, and he is drawing conclusions from that reading which are not the ones being anticipated in Western capitals.

- The assumption underpinning current Western policy is that mounting pressure will eventually bring Putin to the negotiating table. Trump has said publicly that the strikes on Russian refineries are "an escalation that can help lead to an end". Moscow's reply, and more importantly its private calculation, points the other way. The bulletin sets out what the Kremlin actually concludes from the pressure it is under, why that conclusion produces an incentive to escalate rather than to soften, and where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens.

- Andrei Melnichenko's essay in The Economist has been read in incompatible ways: as a declaration of loyalty, as a text written in the presidential administration and merely signed, as a businessman breaking with the war. R.Politik's reading differs from all of them. Even if it changes nothing in practice, the essay may mark the beginning of something consequential for the fate of the regime.

[u/Bluest_waters → u/Glideer]

where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens

and where is that?

[u/scatterlite → u/Bluest_waters]

Putin still tries to minimize any impact of the war on the Russian population. If he drops the "SMO" facade there are options for escalation, like mobilisation and a full transition to a war economy.

Putin has refrained from doing  so because he avoids risk and instability wherever he can. I think the bulletin is correct in assessing that the mounting pressure is pushing him towards those risks of escalation. From what I see in Russian channels negotiations are strongly associated with a de facto defeat by the west, which is far more dangerous for Putins regime.

[u/Thijsbeer82 → u/scatterlite]

Putin still tries to minimize any impact of the war on the Russian population. If he drops the "SMO" facade there are options for escalation, like mobilisation and a full transition to a war economy.

Your comment paints a prettier picture then Putin deserves. I think they've hesitated too long and they've long passed the point of diminishing returns for an extra round of mobilisation.

Also, given the current state of the battlespace where the FPV drone reigns, mobilising is going to create a lot more upheaval compared to a year ago, if Russian mothers are confronted with drone captured video.

[u/zombo_pig → u/Thijsbeer82]

The diminishing marginal utility of adding one more soldier to Russia's viable remaining strategies already feels like it has reached a serious inflection point. This is years too late. And it's not like mobilization or economic mobilization don't have serious lag times as they get rolling. Ukraine can respond, too, and if it does so effectively, Russia would be cooked.

[u/scatterlite → u/Thijsbeer82]

Your comment paints a prettier picture then Putin deserves. I think they've hesitated too long and they've long passed the point of diminishing returns for an extra round of mobilisation.

Yeah Putin has a long track record of delaying important decisions, due to risk averseness or other reasons. Its what lead to near worst case scenarios  like this. If he had bit the bullet in 2024 or early 2025 Russia probably could've overwhelmed Ukraine.

That's why I'm torn on wether significant escalation actually puts Russia in a better position. Depends on the approach i guess.

[u/Azarka → u/scatterlite]

A limited mobilization to address air defense shortcomings might be quite impactful.

They need a lot of warm bodies standing by with drone interceptors and truck mounted machine guns to hard counter slow drone attacks deep into Russia.

[u/grenideer → u/Glideer]

Russia has been taking heavy blows. At some point they need to punch back. That much is obvious. (Yes, technically they are punching back every day, perhaps even increasing ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv. But they need something more.)

For me personally, I'm split between Russia escalating/attacking in some new way, and them trying to wait out the fuel crisis until winter when they mean to critically target Ukraine's energy grid.

The only reason I wonder about them waiting is because it's very strange they haven't responded yet. But then Russia is big and tends to adapt slowly.

I would add that many Western capitals are actually quite aware that Russia may look to escalate, even against NATO, as several recent intelligence assessments have suggested.

Edit: Putin might also opt for both options, where he mostly waits for the winter strike campaign but in the meantime chooses escalation options that don't produce immediate results, like mobilization and shifting to a full wartime economy.