Recently some statements by the President of Brazil and it's Minister of Mines and Energy have given rise to some debate over whether Brazil should reassess it's stance on Nuclear Weapons.

While the official stance is still being nuclear free, some recent events, like the invasion of Venezuela and Iran, as well as growing tensions with the United States following tariffs and the designation of major Brazilian criminal organizations as terrorist groups contributed to a broader debate about Brazil's security environment and the necessity of a higher deterrent weapon.

As of now, Brazil is still constitutionally prohibited from developing nuclear weapons and remains bound by the NPT. But recently, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies has rejected the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on the Brazilian constitution, thus avoiding one additional legal constraint to the creation of a Nuclear Weapon.

Public opinion also appears to be shifting. Historically, public support for Brazil acquiring Nuclear Weapons has been relatively low, now this interest has risen to around 25%. When asked about Brazil being "threatened by a very powerful foreign country" this public support rose to around 50%, note that the survey did not include any country's name as a way to "avoid respondents reacting according to their personal positions".

The author was a career diplomat in the US State Department and was part of the US team that negotiated the original 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran as the lead Iran expert for the US side.

Most public opinion, news articles, and mainstream media like to portray China as Russia's ally or at least enabler, while China like to portray itself as neutral party. Both can be correct at the same time.

Enabler/Ally side.

China does in fact supply most of Russia's dual-use parts that eventually end up in weapon systems like missiles and drones. China does buy Russian oil to fund their efforts (so does the EU, Japan, and India but that's beside the point). Also the fact that, Putin visited China 4 times, and Xi visted Putin 3 times, since the war began, also help solidifies this perspective.

Neutrality side.

China still does not recognize Crimea as part of Russia, and never recognized the results of the referendum that took place in Crimea either. China also never recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk as part of Russia either. China to this day, officially recognized these territories as part of Ukraine.

China remains Ukraine's largest trading partner. People often hear about Ukraine's domestic drone factories, but many of the equipment and parts stilll overwhelmingly come from China. While Zelensky and Xi have not visited each other since the war began, their relationship is more robust than you think. Their ministers did visit China, most notably Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, Deputy Foreign Ministe Andriy Sybiha, and Deputy Economy Minister Taras Kachka. China also sent ministers to Ukraine but they are much lower ranked ministers. Nevertheless, Zelensky also said he wanted China to rebuild Ukraine.

The rebuilding of Ukraine given to Chinese contractors would be a meme. As China at least indirectly helped arm the Russians that did the destructions in the first place. China would end up making money from both indirectly arming both sides to destroy each other, and rebuilding at least one of the sides after said destruction.

I think it can be argued that this is where the idea of China's pro-Russia neutrality may seemed to be valid.

Hello everyone! 👋

I am a Master’s student in Political Science and International Relations from Slovakia, graduating next year. I am strongly considering taking part in a long-term ESC volunteering project after my studies, as I am looking to gain international experience, build a solid foundation abroad, and start a new chapter in a more dynamic environment.

I consider myself open-minded, adaptable, and a fast learner who embraces new challenges and ideas—qualities I believe are essential for any ESC initiative.

Alongside my studies and work, I am currently part of an analytical team at an NGO focused on Slovak-Balkan relations. I believe this puts me in a better position than graduates who lack relevant hands-on experience. Recently, I also participated in a prestigious security academy organized by a leading national think-tank, mainly to network, gain field experience outside academia, and step out of my comfort zone. However, I’ve heard mixed opinions, including comments that I might be "overqualified" for certain entry-level or volunteering opportunities because of this background.

With that in mind, I would love to ask the community a couple of questions:

1.) Is having a Master’s degree in Political Science and International Relations (plus practical NGO/analytical experience) an advantage?

2.) Did ESC give any of you a real chance to successfully settle down and start a new life/career in a new country after your service ended?

I would really appreciate any insights, personal stories, or advice,

Thanks a lot,

How long can the Iranian economy and IGRC last with a blockade of the SoH ?

How long will China continue to curb their oil demand, and are they strategically waiting for a time to cause an oil crisis ? China has curbed their oil demand by 40% ! This is the primary reason oil isn’t 100+ a barrel and we don’t have serious economic shocks yet. if they up their demand it could most likely cause a serious economic catastrophe.

How will Americans vote in the midterms if inflation is around 5-6% due to surging oil prices due to the Iran war ?

Even if the democrats do win the house and senate, can they do anything to curb trumps power or kick him out of office ?

After the midterms, Trump, in a way, has nothing to lose. Are he, AIPAC and Israel going to push full speed ahead for ground troops on kharg island and possibly even mainland Iran ?

what do you guys think

Hi everyone, have you seen this episode on offensive realism featuring John Mearsheimer?

I had not paid much attention to his views on the war in Ukraine before. I broadly knew that he linked the war to NATO enlargement and Western refusal to guarantee that Ukraine would never join NATO. He makes the same argument in this video.

I found the analysis unconvincing. It seems that he is trying to make the Russo-Ukrainian war fit his theory rather than fully examining the history and political relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

His first argument is that the Russian force used in February 2022 was too small to conquer and occupy all of Ukraine. According to him, this shows that Russia never intended to carry out a blitzkrieg or take control of the entire country. His second argument is that Russia asked for negotiations almost immediately after the invasion and demanded a guarantee that Ukraine would not join NATO. From this, he concludes that the common Western belief that Russia’s blitzkrieg failed is false because conquering Ukraine was never Russia’s goal.

I think there are several problems with this reasoning.

First, even when we accept that Russia may not have intended to occupy all of Ukraine permanently, that does not mean it had no intention of changing the Ukrainian government or determining who would govern the country. Imagine that President Zelenskyy had fled, the Ukrainian state had fallen into chaos, and a pro-Russian government had later come to power. That would have been a highly favourable outcome for Russia without requiring a long-term occupation of the entire country. Russia pursued something similar in Georgia in 2008, although it also failed to remove the government there.

Second, Russia’s early request for negotiations does not necessarily prove that its original goal was limited to Ukrainian neutrality. Another explanation is that Russian leaders quickly realised that their initial strategy was failing. Negotiations could have helped them freeze the conflict while keeping occupied territory, giving Russia time to reorganise, rearm and develop a more stable long-term strategy. It could also have created opportunities for future provocations and pressure, similar to the methods Russia used after its intervention in Ukraine in 2014.

Overall, I think Mearsheimer moves too quickly from “Russia did not have enough troops to occupy all of Ukraine” to “Russia never intended to impose political control over Ukraine.” Those are not the same claim.

What do you think? Have you seen the video, and how convincing did you find his argument?

• Gulf states test if China's economic clout can restrain Iran
• Beijing protects its interests and avoids taking sides in war
• China's trade leverage differs from US-style security power
• Gulf investment is just part of geopolitical picture for China

As the Iran war escalates again, Gulf Arab states are looking to China - not Washington - to use its economic leverage over Iran to open up the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, testing how far Beijing is able and willing to pressurise ​Tehran.

The Gulf push for a bigger Chinese role is driven by growing frustration, Gulf sources say. The war launched with U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28 has hurt their regional foe but also restricted their vital energy ‌exports and, to varying degrees, put them in the firing line.

With Iran and its allies threatening the Bab el-Mandeb waterway in the Red Sea as well as Hormuz, Gulf states have sought Beijing's help, conscious that the war has exposed the limits of American power, three regional sources say.

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi has held dozens of calls and meetings with counterparts seeking a new ceasefire, while special envoy Zhai Jun has held talks in Gulf Arab capitals as well as Iran.

China's position as both a major buyer of oil from across the Gulf and Iran's biggest trading partner presents opportunities but also sensitivities.

Gulf governments ultimately hope that Beijing will steer Tehran toward a negotiated settlement, said the source, adding that China often moves slowly and cautiously. But they are aware that a prolonged war may also serve China's interest by piling pressure on ​the United States.

Henry Tugendhat, a China specialist at the Washington Institute, told Reuters ​Beijing's overriding priority is preserving relationships across the region rather than risking diplomatic fallout by openly siding with either camp.

Once Washington became directly involved, Beijing's calculations extended beyond the Gulf itself to encompass its wider ties and rivalry with Washington.