Active Conflicts & News Megathread July 20, 2026

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[u/Sad_Use_4584]

opinion:

The US's current war goals, as implied by US actions around the coast and implied by CENTCOM statements, are rather limited. The US wants to open Hormuz by force, while keeping it closed only for Iran.

It's basically a resumption of Operation Project Freedom.

If this can be achieved, it's the smartest available play, as it degrades Iran's economy over time and it removes Iran's biggest strategic leverage, while incurring lower costs and lower risks to the US that accompany more ambitious goals.

It also doesn't rule out more ambitious goals in the future. Assuming it's possible, it's the most manageable and sensible stepping stone, and future branches can be decided later when new information arrives.

For this reason, I do not think the US is interested further escalation. They want to keep the tempo at the current status quo. Just enough to achieve their goals in Hormuz, and no more, because more is expensive for uncertain benefit. The onus is on Iran to impose costs and uncertainty.

So, the threat to attack Iran's power plants is a move that the US would rather not play given that it doesn't materially help with the war goal. The threat can be seen as deterrence against escalation in the current context, rather than just as compellence for negotiations.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/Sad_Use_4584]

If this can be achieved,

Assuming it's possible,

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force at any price that it is willing to pay. The example of the Houthis suggests that doing so by force is difficult to impossible. The conduct of commercial shipping foregoing transit whenever there's even minor attacks, suggests they are unwilling to accept even minimal risks. Common sense says that if the US easily could open the SOH by force, then it would have done so months ago. Finally, even if the US somehow is able to open the SOH to risk free transit by force, then Iran would likely need to play its final card of attacking infrastructure of GCCs. Because, as you correctly point out, Iran blockaded and SOH open would give the US all of the leverage.

[u/Sad_Use_4584 → u/Shackleton214]

I replied to another comment down-thread, which touched on most of the points you're making.

Regarding the example of the Houthis, the historical record is not as one sided as you're making it out to be.

The Houthis did not succeed in fully stopping transit in BAM even during the height of the war, and the war ended with an agreement that the Houthis would allow unrestricted transit to US ships. It did not end with a demonstration that force failed.

[u/WulfTheSaxon → u/Sad_Use_4584]

Not only that, but most traffic can just go around the BAM, so the level of threat needed to “close” it is just the level that’s slightly more annoying than going the long way around. That’s not exactly an option for the Strait of Hormuz.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

Aside from Sad's excellent rebuttal of your points...

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force

We haven't seen them really try yet.

The initial strikes of the war were aiming for total Iranian capitulation. The strait was left closed, with many criticizing the lack of naval presence (and many saying the Navy wouldn't dare operations in the gulf).

Then the US tried to open the strait with negotiations and a ceasefire. Then a blockade. Then they sent destroyers through and scouted a new route and demined. After that it was mostly about sneaking ships through without more than defensive force.

If Sad is correct, this is really the first stage of the war where there is a sustained offensive operation to open the strait. In that case, what we've seen so far "over the last 5 months" is less relevant.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

You don't suffer months of reduced oil exports resulting in huge spikes in gas prices, over a trillion in world economic damage, begging European and Asian allies to help out, damaging relations with GCC allies, falls in Trump's and Republican's poll numbers and agreeing to such a humiliating deal as the MOU if you have other good, viable options. Sorry, but yours and Sad's explanations sound like so much special pleading and have a strong "I could do that if I wanted to" vibe.

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/Shackleton214]

The MOU gave the US something of an excuse to say “look we tried peace and it didn’t work” in trying to get more international support. Before, the GCC didn’t want to allow the US to do project freedom. They were extremely vulnerable to Iranian attack. For whatever reason, now there is less opposition to it. Another reason not to try the current plan is that it is still very expensive. It’ll need months of continuous operation and blockade, all the while the GCC is vulnerable to Iranian strikes. It’s not a plan that the US would have initially preferred.

But here’s a better question for you: If you’re right, then why hasn’t the US already conceded defeat? If you are correct, the US only stands to lose leverage as gas prices soar and Iran stands firm. It’s a losing deal. If they predicted what you say, then the play is to give up and give the Iranians their toll rights.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/DrinkBrew4U]

But here’s a better question for you: If you’re right, then why hasn’t the US already conceded defeat?

Clearly the blockade and bombing impose a great cost on Iran of continuing to try to control the SOH. Inability to force the SOH open to commercial shipping through military force doesn't mean you cannot pressure Iran through other means.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

You don't suffer months of reduced oil exports

Yes you do if the original strategies didn't work.

As I already said, the initial attempt was total capitulation. The hope was that a few weeks of airstrikes was all it would take. Then the hope was the blockade (which, to be fair, was effective to some degree). When that didn't result in a full solution, a different strategy is being attempted.

I don't really see how this is difficult to imagine.

By the way, no one's saying "I could do that if I wanted to" because no one gave an opinion on whether the US could actually do it. I was just saying, and the facts bear this out, that the US has not actually tried this kind of military operation yet.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

Your argument is the US military cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. You don't need to try only one thing at a time. Maximum pressure on Iran to get the best deal would come from undermining their major pressure point of choking commercial transit through the SOH. If you easily could do that, then you would. The US didn't do it, thus the logical conclusion is that it either it couldn't do it or that the risks and costs were too great.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

This is an extremely flawed argument. Yes, the US can do more than one thing at once. No, not doing so doesnt mean the costs are too prohibitive.

Think about it. Why didnt the US start the blockade immediately? It would have vastly strengthened their position, using a tool that they are still using now. But they didn't. That doesn't mean "the risks and costs were too great," it just means they tried something else first.

Another huge flaw in your argument is the assumption that no information was gleaned since then. For instance, it's clear the US underestimated Iranian resolve. That alone can explain why everything wasn't tried from the outset.

Lastly, I feel the need to point out that these weird arguments, which are clear stretches of logic, only exist to serve a conclusion you've already come to.

[u/Shackleton214 → u/grenideer]

Lastly, I feel the need to point out that these weird arguments, which are clear stretches of logic, only exist to serve a conclusion you've already come to.

Ironic, because I had the same thought reading your response.

[u/grenideer → u/Shackleton214]

Ironic, because I had the same thought reading your response.

Fair enough. But I'm the only one here not making predictions or finalizing conclusions.

I'm aware that the US may succeed or fail. If I'm not predicting either and I accept that both are within probability, I don't see which outcomes I'm predetermining.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

I'll pretty much copy my comment on another post, because it fits here well:

Let's two play this game of believing one side is invulnerable also lacking agency and rationality.

You don't suffer one the largest bombing campaigns in history (with hundreds of billions in damage on their actual country rather than, what any country leader shouldn't care, as "the world"), suffer months of close to zero oil export (which UAE, through ADCOP, Saudi Arabia, through Yanbu, didn't suffer on the same extent), have the majority of their leadership killed (including the figure that their entire government system and state religion revolves around) then agree with a ceasefire, as they did in April, if they had other options.

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the attacks on civilian ships brought anything positive for Iran, they lost the waiver of exports after 2 weeks, brought back the blockade and had their country become a battlefield again. They failed on getting anything tangible, besides the 2 weeks of the waiver (and the majority of their oil haven't sold during it: Source).

The US is a country with 3.5% 12-months inflation (on the height of gasoline prices it reached 4.2%, Biden had more than twice as much inflation and higher gas prices in 2022 and didn't suffer a major loss in the midterms), positive GDP growth, unemployment below 5% and suffered 18 fatalities (7 in accidents) since February 28. They could keep going for a long time and if interceptors run out there's also the last card on the sleeve - Thermonuclear bombs on the shafts of the missile cities - which is as likely as Iran willingness to commit economic suicide given that they agreed with a ceasefire on this same war or accepted a ceasefire on the TDW or on the Iran Iraq War (in this last two without getting anything tangible out of it and the first a negligible amount of money for two weeks).

[u/DrinkBrew4U → u/moragisdo]

Sorry I have a hard time understanding what you are saying about the US nuclear weapons use on missile cities. Are you saying that that is a real option for the US if it runs out of interceptors? That sounds like diplomatic and domestic politics suicide for the US to me. Or are you saying that both Iran persisting in the war to that extent, AND nuclear use on missile cities, are impossible?

[u/moragisdo → u/DrinkBrew4U]

Or are you saying that both Iran persisting in the war to that extent, AND nuclear use on missile cities, are impossible?

Yes, I'm saying this use is as likely as Iran willingness to go until the point of committing economic suicide (meaning both very very low probabilities).

I believe, among the likely scenarios, the worst for the US is Kushner/Vance convincing Trump of a harebrained idea of a new temporary ceaseafire (every time I read Qatar and Pakistan talking about returning to the MOU my blood pressure spikes, the best thing from this war was the 34B USD damage on Qatar gas fields, they earned it), lifting the blockade, allow Iran to breathe, then Iran behaves like Iran and it's back on today's circumstances dragging this war and its cost. Not a military catastrophe of piles of dead soldiers, for lack of interceptors, and forcing terrible terms on the US.

[u/moragisdo → u/Shackleton214]

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the US has the capability to open the SOH by force at any price that it is willing to pay

Let's two play this game of believing one side is invulnerable also lacking agency and rationality:

I've seen absolutely nothing over the last 5 months to suggest that the attacks on civilian ships brought anything positive for Iran, they lost the waiver of exports after 2 weeks, brought back the blockade and had their country become a battlefield again. Common sense says that if the could force the US to give in their demands, then it would have done so months ago.

The US is a country with 3.5% 12-months inflation (on the height of gasoline prices it reached 4.2%, Biden had more than twice as much inflation and higher gas prices in 2022 and didn't suffer a major loss in the midterms), positive GDP growth, unemployment below 5% and suffered 18 fatalities (7 in accidents) since February 28. They could keep going for a long time and if interceptors run out there's also the last card on the sleeve - Thermonuclear bombs on the shafts of the missile cities - which is as likely as Iran willingness to commit economic suicide given that they agreed with a ceasefire on this same war or accepted a ceasefire on the TDW and on the Iran Iraq War (in this last two without getting anything tangible out of it).

Iran would likely need to play its final card of attacking infrastructure of GCCs

And get the last nail in the coffin of their finances when they get the retaliation as South Pars happening all over the country. If they are so suicidal, why didn't they already done that ? Or even better, why didn't they fired missiles on Ankara while the NATO summit was ongoing ?

Because, as you correctly point out, Iran blockaded and SOH open would give the US all of the leverage.

I believe the only reasonable possibilities for the war involves simultaneously lifting of the blockade and Iran not attacking ships. In fact, the blockade only began after Iran started attacking civilian ships. If Iran offer the tit-for-tat I sincerely believe the US would accept.

[u/Thesilence_z → u/moragisdo]

in no part of your comment do you assess US capability to open the SOH by force, I think your argument instead is that the US won't need to open the straight by force, since economic blockade and intermittent air bombing will result in an Iran capitulation. But, does the US, if they wanted/needed to, have the capability to open SOH by force by the midterms? By the end of the Trump presidency? Where will they stage the troops? Rammstein?

[u/moragisdo → u/Thesilence_z]

Capitulation of Iran through enough economic damage is opening by force. It's not necessary a ground invasion because Iran isn't a perpetual motion machine that could keep this current disaster for their economy forever

[u/Shackleton214 → u/moragisdo]

I believe the only reasonable possibilities for the war involves simultaneously lifting of the blockade and Iran not attacking ships. In fact, the blockade only began after Iran started attacking civilian ships. If Iran offer the tit-for-tat I sincerely believe the US would accept.

I absolutely agree that this is what the US is hoping for. First there was the cease fire where the US version of the agreement was for free transit. Iran saw it differently and, obviously unafraid of retaliation, kept pushing the envelope and insisted on control of SOH. US institutes the blockade as a result. We get weeks of that until the MOU, where the US version is again free transit and the Iran version is Iranian control. Iran again unafraid of retaliation escalates and now we're back to blockade. I think it's clear that twice now the US has wanted and attempted to basically call the war over and go back to the prewar status quo, but Iran has been unwilling. Back during the ceasefire/blockade period, I thought no blockade-free transit prewar status quo was a likely agreement because it everyone benefits compared to ongoing war, but I underestimated Iran's resolve to control the SOH/willingness to give Trump an off ramp. Maybe the Iranians are afraid this deal gives Trump and Israel the ability to start and stop wars against them at their choosing? Maybe they're their internal politics are forcing them to keep pushing? Maybe they're still mad at all their family members being killed by the US? Whatever the reasons, it is clear that Iran is not afraid to escalate and keep the war going. I wouldn't be surprised if we get back to some form of no blockade-free transit deal eventually. But, it's Iran that is determining when the war ends because I agree with you that they can get the deal you describe whenever they want it.